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INTRODUCTION 
 
The period elapsing from 2008 to 2012 has been scrutinized by practitioners and 
academia for the extraordinary volatility experienced by financial markets, for a 
perceived fragility of the banking sector, for one of the most active interventions 
of policy makers and for the recessions experienced by many countries. Many 
refer to this period as a Financial Crisis and dispute on the many causes that 
may explain it.  
In this work we will analyze the evolution of the liability side of the balance 
sheet for the banking sector throughout these years. We will try to derive some 
conclusion on specific components of the capital structure such as senior and 
subordinated debt; we will also address the question of the adequacy of equity 
for the single financial institutions in light of the perceived fragility of financial 
markets. 
Current times rely on measures of capital adequacy based on the definition of 
regulatory capital and regulatory ratios: this work will propose a different metric 
which is more market oriented and less accounting dependent. 
Any journey during these fascinating years could not avoid reserving a major 
role to the protagonist of the financial crisis: systemic risk. This theme has not 
only attracted the attention of the most renowned authors in academia but 
urged the intervention of the most influential policy makers to avoid the collapse 
of the financial system. 
 
Why a journey though the capital structure of the banking sector? 
Banks have been quite challenged by recent years of financial turbulence: they 
have suffered an amount of losses and experienced a scarcity of liquidity such as 
to trigger the implementation of monetary policies and bail out programs to re-
establish an ordinary evolution of financial markets. 
The evolution of the value of assets (via financials) does not testify these 
moments of financial difficulties, due to their representation via an accounting 
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metric that privileges a long term view, thus disregarding a theoretical fair value 
consistent with times of high risk aversion. This has produced a reading of the 
capital via accounting measures progressively at odds with the market cap of the 
financial institutions. The financial sector has experienced therefore a major 
reduction of the ratio market capitalization/tangible book value; this thesis also 
proposes how to address the striking difference between the accounting value of 
the tangible book with respect to the valuation expressed by the market. 
Hence this work investigates the behavior of the liability side of the banking 
sector, given that debt and equity are usually quoted in regulated market; when 
the value of debt is too illiquid, then the author avails himself of the CDS values, 
introducing assumptions that will be specified below. 
This journey through the capital structure of the banking sector will trigger an 
in-depth analysis of the questions 
 Do CDS levels reflect a risk of default specific of the financial institution or 
they also reflect a scarcity of liquidity which may be experienced by the 
system? If so, does monetary policy matter for the purpose of the 
evolution of CDS? 
 What happens when the market has no appetite for the subscription of 
senior issuance? 
 Does volatility of debt matter? 
 How does the volatility of debt compare with the volatility of equity? 
 If we abandon a regulatory metric of capital how do we determine if the 
market estimates that the capital structure of a bank is sound enough for 
the amount of risk it bears on the assets? 
We will list below few themes which will be of central importance in the following 
chapters. 
 
Analysis of CDS levels 
The analysis of the levels of senior debt would be quite difficult given that the 
financial crisis was characterized by periods with no appetite for fresh senior 
issuance underwriting and that most of the banks placed their senior debt to 
their own retail. Therefore financial senior debt has reduced the volumes 
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exchanged on the secondary market and is most of the times regarded as an 
illiquid asset class, especially if issued by a financial institution affected by a 
multiple downgrade during the financial crisis. 
For this reason we analyze the levels of CDS, not only because daily data is 
available, but also because, being them quoted by major market players, they 
reflect a risk estimated by institutional players; on the other hand debt is also 
subscribed by retail, thus resulting in a pricing biased by players with limited 
information. Hence the analysis of CDS will exclude such bias. 
We will implicitly assume that the value of debt will be par when it yields Euribor 
+ CDS: subsequent higher level of the CDS (widening) will represent a drop in 
value of the debt and viceversa. 
The analysis of debt via its cds levels will prove useful when analyzing the 
volatility and a comparison with the one experienced by equity. This will allow an 
insight on the perceived soundness of the capital structure (second part of this 
work). 
 
Systemic Risk 
This concept will be widely explored in the second part of this work, dedicated 
more generally to the theme of capital structure of financial institutions. We will 
propose a new definition of systemic risk, centered on the idea that a volatile 
debt makes the refinancing mechanism of the banking sector volatile, thus 
generating a financial instability of systemic relevance. This intuition will also 
prove valuable to address the intuition of endogenous risk, as proposed by 
Danielsson and recalled in the second part of the thesis. 
Although better addressed in the second part of this work, systemic risk will also 
be the implicit topic in the first part of the work, given that CDS levels will be 
explained via variables that are not firm specific. Although only in the second 
part of the work we will strive to provide a definition for systemic risk, the 
empirical consideration that CDS levels of financial issuers may be explained by 
common variables corroborates the idea that risk is driven mainly by system 
variables and not only by idiosyncratic ones. 
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In the second part of the work we will build on these intuitions and we will not 
limit the analysis to CDS levels (in their role to summarize the evolution of 
senior debt), but we will also include equity to assess if it is consistent with the 
risk/volatility of the assets. 
 
Mark to Market vs Accounting Value 
Before the latest financial crisis the world was expericing a regime of lower 
volatility, especially when dealing with Fixed Income Markets. Defaults were 
hardly perceived as systemic and International Accounting Standards made a 
special effort to introduce rules to align the values of the financial assets to a 
logic of Mark to Market rather than historical cost. Such effort led to the 
introduction of the so called “Financial Assets”, whereas “Loans and Receivables” 
would (still) be evaluated at the historical levels. 
Needless to say, this effort has introduced a higher degree of transparency for 
some of the assets of the bank: this was traded off against a higher variability of 
equity reserves: the latter reduce while the financial assets experience a drop in 
value. 
The extraordinary volatility of the financial assets experienced during recent 
years has proved hardly sustainable for some banks, reporting an 
unprecedented volatility of capital reserves. This accounting volatility of the 
equity component of the balance sheet triggered the reaction of regulators, 
allowing to suspend the mark to market computation of some financial assets, 
for the purpose of computing regulatory capital. Exploring the terms and 
consequences of these norms would be beyond the scope of this work; this 
serves as an introduction to the striking difference between market capitalization 
of a bank and the value of its tangible book via balance sheet reading. 
We summarize the evolution of the ratio market capitalization/tangible book for 
various financial European institutions in the appendix. Such comparison 
motivates the conclusion that the market has grown a sense of skepticism 
towards the regulatory and accounting reading of balance sheets. The 
introduction of a new metric which may address the concern of the market and 
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provide guidance on how to manage the balance sheet of the bank (without 
accounting bias) is introduced in the second section of this work. 
 
Volatility 
Accounting and regulatory guidelines do not give a crucial role to volatility: yet 
an investor or a regulator should find this information very relevant for the 
purpose of evaluating a financial institution. 
The most relevant capital measure from a regulatory point of view, Tier 1 
capital, does not give volatility a crucial role: the main framework rotates around 
the accounting model as a representation of Assets and Liabilities values, 
according to a certain set of rules, at specific dates. 
Recent turbulent times have shown instead that the most volatile times have 
been accompanied by a series of stress tests conducted to address the capital 
strength of the banking sector; Liquidity of financial institutions was particularly 
scrutinized due to the reluctance from the market to subscribe senior debt 
during the periods of highest volatility. In this introduction we are being very 
vague in relation to the concept of volatility: the author aims at motivating the 
importance of this input in managing the bank, from a liquidity and capital point 
of view; The second part of this thesis will specify variables apt to resemble the 
composition of assets and the volatility of such variables will be analyzed in 
detail. 
This introduction motivates why capital management is ultimately about dealing 
with risk and measuring the adequacy of equity to represent a sizable buffer 
against the joint volatility of assets. When the risk of the assets explains poorly 
the variations in value of equity and it has a satisfactory explanatory power on 
debt, then senior issuance is no longer functioning as term liquidity provider 
only: as a consequence the bank may experience liquidity shortages. We will 
build on this intuition and on the subtle difference between solvency and 
illiquidity in the second and third chapter. 
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APPENDIX 
Divergence of Accounting versus Market Value 
 
TABLE 1: EVOLUTION IN TIME OF THE RATIO MARKET CAPITALIZATION/ TANGIBLE BOOK 
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CHAPTER 1:   
A  FRAMEWORK FOR LIQU IDITY 
MANAGEMENT AND THE EVOLUTION OF 
SENIOR DEBT DURING 2008-2013.  
 
Motivation 
Since 2007 policy makers have been facing unprecedented times, which required 
their intervention in more than one occasion and sometimes jointly across 
different monetary areas. Liquidity within the banking system has played a 
crucial role in recent years: the banking system saw the intervention of 
regulators and sovereign states across the whole capital structure (in 
guaranteeing senior debt issuance and in subscribing shares/ subordinated 
debt). Debt, be it sovereign or private, is scrutinized in its sustainability and 
correction measures are being taken by sovereign states and by the banking 
system in a common aim of deleverage. 
This study analyzes the crucial role of liquidity in a deleverage process and finds 
that under certain conditions central banks can no longer rely on an efficient 
transmission mechanism of their monetary input through the banking system. 
Rather than considering the latter a transmission tool, central banks try to 
preserve liquidity at critical level for the survival of the banking system. 
Ultimately this work provides an answer to how important liquidity is for the 
purpose of explaining CDS levels in an economy characterized by a financial 
crisis, credit deterioration and deleverage. 
For the avoidance of doubt this study will never adopt the term “Liquidity” to 
denote efficiency in the financial market with respect to the price of one 
particular instrument, but will always refer to the portion of the monetary base 
readily available to the banking system, as a cash reserve or for the purpose of 
redeeming debts. 
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Related Literature 
This study contributes to, at least, two strands of literature.  
The first one is represented by the field of studies investigating the determinants 
of CDS spreads, with a focus on the recent years of financial turbulence. The 
main contribution of this work is in the emphasis of the role of liquidity, meant 
as degree of cash availability, in explaining the evolution of CDS whose 
reference entities are Banks. Many other factors are identified by literature:  
Dieckmann and Plank (2010) find evidence that government CDS of various 
countries find explanatory variables in the country’s domestic financial system 
and the state of the world financial system (represented via variables 
respectively “Country Specific” and “Global”). Fontana and Scheiche (2010) 
identify the main determinants of the bond and CDS Spreads; they employ a 
lead-lag analysis for bonds and CDS to determine which market is more 
important in terms of price discovery. They also explore the evolution of the 
Basis between bonds and CDS, a variable which is also central in this work. 
The second strand of literature is related to the link existing between sovereign 
CDS and banks CDS. On this topic the main contribution of this work is in 
expanding such link from a regional viewpoint (typically literature investigates 
the link between government CDS and its local banks) to a more aggregated 
monetary area perspective. In emphasizing such wider approach we refer to 
“Global Consolidation” as the consolidation of the entire banking sector: we 
strive to draw conclusions (via an econometric approach) on the entire banking 
sector rather than a regional subset. Acharya et al. (2011) provide a model for 
the interrelation of banks and government credit risk. Focusing on the current 
financial crisis, Demirguc and Huiziniga (2010) find that banks CDS level react to 
the deterioration of public finances conditions. High levels of public debt hamper 
the support to the financial sector and too big to fail banks may turn into too big 
to be saved. Ejsing and Lemke (2011) investigate the relationship between 
Sovereign and Banks CDS via a common risk factor, i.e. the Itraxx CDS Index of 
non-financial corporations (this work instead will analyze the evolution of the 
Itraxx CDS Index of financial corporations and will adopt the Non-Financial index 
as one of the regressors to explain the evolution of financial CDS). Alter and 
Schuler (2012) investigate the interdependence of the default risk of several 
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Eurozone countries and their domestic banks. Knaup and Wagner (2009) have 
found that correlation between banks stock returns and an index of corporate 
CDS spreads provides a good indication of bank asset risk exposure during the 
financial crisis. 
Another field of literature considers liquidity as a feature to take into account as 
a deviation from a frictionless market. This leads theoretical works to redefine 
self-financing trading strategies with additional restrictions on hedging strategies 
(Cetin, Jarrow and Protter). Liquidity may also be considered when defining a 
Liquidity Stochastic Discount Factor (Chen, Cheng and Wu, 2005, and  Buhler 
and Trapp, 2006 and 2008). Other more empirical approaches consider liquidity 
as one of the risky factors to include in the framework of CAPM to explain the 
return of a portfolio of CDS contracts.  
This work emphasizes a different meaning of liquidity and it does not consider it 
as just one of the factors to explain the CDS levels for the portion that cannot be 
related to credit risk: liquidity during the financial crisis is an important variable 
in explaining the levels of the CDS whose reference entities are the most levered 
players in financial markets: Banks and, in general, financial institutions. This 
angle of liquidity is also analyzed by Vento and La Ganga (2009), who deal with 
Liquidity in a perspective of risk management addressing the Bank Liquidity Risk 
Management in light of the market turmoil experienced in recent years. Angelo 
Baglioni deals with liquidity crunch in the interbank market (2009): his model 
can explain the phenomenon of “flight to overnight” in traded volumes and 
produce outcomes of high spreads between interest rates at different maturities. 
 
Introduction  
This work is an attempt to address some topics of central importance during the 
financial crisis: 
 Balance Sheet Deleverage 
 Debt Markets not capable of addressing the refinancing needs of the 
banking sector 
 Capital Structure 
 Evolution of Sovereign CDS and Banks’ CDS 
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 The role of monetary policy and its reliance on the banking system as a 
transmission mechanism 
These topics will ultimately lead to addressing the main questions of this study: 
What is the role of liquidity in explaining the level of Banks’ CDS? For the portion 
not attributable to Liquidity are we dealing with systemic risk or simply an entity 
specific risk?  
Economic models typically describe equilibrium as a point of convergence of 
different agents acting within an economy: one interesting aspect is to consider 
the forces into play after a shock. What exactly connects variables and how do 
they interact until economy stabilizes after the shock? The financial crisis 
unfolded in 2008-2012 can be conceived as a long (and harsh) adjustment 
process, often with the bold intervention of Central Banks and governments. 
Admittedly, analyzing a crisis from a financial viewpoint only is reductive since 
literature and intuition argues in favour of a crisis as a result of real and financial 
imbalances. Nevertheless, real variables take a long period to adjust and policy 
makers are left with the task of dealing with systemic risk and sustainability of 
the monetary areas: these issues sometimes need to be faced with a response 
far quicker than the structural adjustment of real variables.  
The transmission mechanism is today the first concern when addressing survival 
of the system: the banking sector is indeed a transmission mechanism of both 
monetary inputs and deleverage policies.  
Hence this study is composed by a simple theoretical framework where the key 
role is played by a liquidity constraint of the banking sector. We will impose a 
liabilities rolling constraint in the ordinary functioning of the banking sector. We 
will analyze the same liquidity constraint when the debt market does not clear. 
We will justify this event with a drop in profitability of the banking sector, such 
that the endogenous growth for equity is inferior to the endogenous growth of 
debt, thus forecasting an amount of equity far too low to protect bond holders 
from insolvency risk. Satisfying the liquidity constraint will be considered as the 
event of No Default: if the market for financial debt does not clear, the role of 
liabilities towards central bank will be crucial to avoid default. Such liabilities 
imply injection of liquidity, hence the liquidity may have an explanatory value on 
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probabilities of default. We will show whether this intuition is confirmed by a 
linear regression model applied to a set of financial data. 
How realistic is that Return on Equity for Banks may be lower than interest paid 
to roll liabilities? If this were the case, the capital structure would evolve 
endogenously towards a higher percentage of debt: this inevitably will be 
discounted by financial markets when pricing Debt and when subscribing new 
issuances. When Equity estimated by the market is too low compared to the 
stock of debt, the debt market no longer clears (this ultimately is the event of an 
excessive leverage).  
The transmission mechanism proposed here is that a suboptimal capital 
structure causes a rise in the CDS of the bank, and a decrease in the speed of 
growth of equity (due to profitability reduction). A necessary condition for a bank 
capital structure to be stable (hence resilient to shocks) is that speed of growth 
of equity is equal or higher (within a certain timeframe) than the debt growth 
rate. If such necessary condition is not satisfied, the market prices a reduction of 
the equity percentage in the capital structure: financial debt is then forecast to 
bear equity risk. Market may then not clear, in the sense that no demand can 
absorb the supply of the financial debt which is meant to be rolled to finance 
imminent redemptions. In a framework where the level of CDS is assumed to be 
the credit spread for the new issuance (when the market for financial debt 
clears), financial CDS rise with a strong signalling power for central bank. 
Central bank then is called to assess how sound the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy is. Intervention by the central bank is crucial in shaping the 
future capital structure of the bank, by controlling the refinancing rules. By 
setting a credit spread for refinancing below CDS, central bank addresses the 
problem by reducing the speed of growth of debt, thus not compressing the 
percentage of equity relative to debt. 
By enlarging or reducing the set of constraints in defining the refinancing rules, 
the central bank influences the forward capital structure of a bank. The incentive 
for the central bank to intervene is mainly in preserving an orderly transmission 
mechanism of monetary inputs: a capital structure controllable in its evolution 
does not force management to a drastic deleverage (as a way to implement a 
debt reduction). 
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In this work we show that the liquidity availability for financial institutions is one 
of the explanatory variables for levels of CDS. The ability to satisfy liquidity 
constraints then influences the probability of default of the entire European 
banking sector, due to the strong interconnection of the liquidity conditions 
across banks. Hence the contribution of this study is in emphasizing that a 
probability of default can be explained via systemic variables not immediately 
attributable to the insolvency of one specific bank: one of these systemic 
variables is the liquidity available to the banking sector. If variations across time 
of CDS levels could be explained by systemic variables, then the approach to 
liquidity and solvency by addressing such themes to the specific financial 
institution is arguable. We will explore in depth this theme m in chapter 2 and 3.  
 
Modeling Banks’ Capital Structure 
We represent the assets of a bank as a sequence     . Every year there will be a 
decision made by management on the amounts of new loans and financial assets 
which we will denote by the sequence       . Every year some of the assets will 
redeem in a certain percentage of the total Nominal Amount of the assets. Such 
percentage of the assets redeeming will be denoted by a(t) . Also, some assets 
will have to be impaired by a certain percentage     , so that in a year the 
amounts of assets on balance sheet are 
1 
                                           
Hence the evolution of the assets is described by (not including cash in the 
category “assets”1) 
{               }   
Such assets are financed with a mixture of liabilities, namely 
    : Deposits at time t 
    : Bond outstanding at time t 
     : Liabilities against the central bank at time t 
                                                             
1 Assets for the purpose of this chapter will be the items on balance sheet requiring financing. 
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    : Capital at time t 
As with assets, every year there will be an amount of issued bonds redeeming 
and new bonds issuance. For this reason the amount      can be re-written as 
the sum of all past issuance from time         until time t. We are implicitly 
assuming that the past       years contribute to the stock of issued bonds. 
Whereas all bonds issued more than       years ago redeemed, the stock of 
current liabilities, B(t) is described by the following  
      ∑
 
          
      
Similarly, assets are mainly legacy from past investment decisions: namely last 
      years contributed to the new composition of assets, so that the stock of 
assets is given by the sum of the investment decisions from time         until 
time t 
      ∑
 
          
      
The bank typically runs a transformation of maturities from liabilities to assets, 
in the sense that we should expect that the maturity of the assets be higher 
than the maturities of the liabilities. This maturity gap will prove of crucial 
importance when the banking system goes through a financial crisis: we will 
explore this aspect in a section below, when analyzing the liabilities rolling 
constraint. 
A given set of liabilities as represented above will originate a certain profit for 
the year: we will assume that the bond issuance produces a cost of Euribor2 + 
CDS, where CDS is the credit default swap of the issuer, at the time of issuance.  
Euribor may be defined as the rate of interest at which panel banks borrow funds 
from other panel banks, in marketable size, in the interbank market, for short 
term maturities. Hence CDS may be considered, for the purpose of this model, 
the additional cost for securing term liquidity. 
                                                             
2 Euribor may be replaced by an analogous short term rate valid in monetary areas other than 
Euro. The rationale does not change: we are assuming that the cost of issuing debt is Short term 
rate + CDS, where CDS is the credit default swap level for  the reference entity selling its own 
debt. 
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From the description of the liabilities above, then the actual cost paid by the 
bank for its bond issuance is given by a historical average of the CDS levels over 
the last       years. We will denote such average across past years as         
The assets are a differentiated pool of credits towards various sectors of the 
economy, hence yielding a spread of             ;             is the level of the 
average CDS across all industrial and financial names (denoted as          ) over 
the past       years. Clearly the bank may include among its assets credits 
towards firms which may not be reference entities in the CDS market: we are 
implicitly assuming that the CDS market may provide a proxy for the yield of 
assets by observing the average level of all traded CDS (therefore obtaining a 
diversification that the assets of a bank may achieve while granting credit). 
Similarly, the cost for the liabilities is given by the sum of Euribor and        ; 
the latter is an average across the past       years of the level        .  
More formally, for all s between               
2 
        = 
 
    
∑             
 
       
 
And 
3 
            = 
 
    
∑                
 
       
 
 
Deposits and Central Bank Financing 
For the sake of simplicity we will consider the cost for liabilities composed by 
Deposits equal to Eonia3. Eonia, for the purpose of this work, is to be defined as 
the weighted average of overnight Interbank Offer Rates for inter-bank loans. 
The liabilities against the central bank will instead produce a cost of v(t).  
Central banks publish criteria to distinguish assets that may represent an 
admissible guarantee when the bank requires financing. Assets that comply with 
                                                             
3 The notation so far introduced clearly shows that the author is primarily thinking of European 
variables: yet it is easy to generalize for every monetary area to find the equivalent rate with 
identical meaning. 
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such criteria are denominated “Elegible Assets”: such criteria then lead to 
identifying a fraction of the assets, to be denoted4 as ρ, which represents 
admissible collateral for repo transactions with the central bank. A higher 
number of eligibility criteria means a restrictive policy input. On the contrary, 
relaxation of parameters and longer tenor available for repo transactions 
represent an accommodative policy input. In this model such monetary input, in 
the form or number of eligibility criteria will be summarized by the variable ρ 
(     ). 
Deposits include liabilities versus the retail sector, redeemable with no notice. 
They also include unsecured lending in the interbank market and repo 
transactions with collateral where a repo market has developed5. 
The purpose of this study is to consider the banking system as an aggregate 
sector, hence the interbank deposit market will not be considered when 
evaluating the tools for liabilities management of the consolidated banking 
sector. 
Deposits are by far the cheapest and the most stable6 liability for the banking 
sector. This study will focus on the difficulties arising when debt issuance is no 
longer a tool for the purpose of liability management. Modeling a deposit run 
would be beyond the purpose of this work: a deposit run, if assumed against the 
entire banking sector would produce the collapse of the banking system and 
financial markets. We would thus enter the field of tail events, which calls for 
extreme measures of economic policies. Modeling such scenarios, dominated by 
frictions and panic is a pure theoretical exercise, which would be of no use in this 
framework. 
We will then write the profit, as determined every year when publishing 
financials as 
                                                             
4 Such percentage of assets is referred to the “counterbalance capacity” in the banks’ portfolio. 
5Typical repo markets where the banking system can enter repo contracts have as underlying 
assets government bonds; similar markets exist for quoted stocks when the stock lending activity 
has reached a certain relevance.  
6 Maybe it would be more appropriate to write the least unstable, especially when compared with 
senior debt. 
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4 
     [                  ]       [               ]                           
              
The reader may argue that the banking system may not use the full amounts of 
refinancing facilities offered by the central bank; hence the amount of assets 
refinanced may be lower than ρ. We would need then to introduce a different 
notation for the portion of assets actually refinanced with the central bank within 
this general framework. We avoid doing so since the model will soon focus on 
condition of distress of the financial markets, and the first reaction of the 
banking system is to use the central bank facilities at maximum potential as we 
will discuss below.  
C is a generic cost that is not linked to the capital structure and to the 
investment decisions of the bank. Within this framework the potential profit for 
the banking system depends on the evolution of            relative to        . 
When such difference decreases, financial markets question the capability of the 
banking sector to produce profits in the foreseeable future. Reluctance to 
subscribe financial debt with long maturities follows, which leads to levels of 
        closer and closer to       . Higher levels of Financial CDS typically are 
correlated with high levels of     , a further reason for disputing the future 
profitability of the banking sector. This theme will be analyzed in more detail in 
the next paragraph. 
 
No clearing Price for debt 
We have analyzed how to decompose the profit for year t into revenues from the 
assets and costs on liabilities. 
The market will cast a doubt on the sustainability of the capital structure when 
observing the yield of assets approaching the cost of liabilities. In this section we 
will ignore the operational/ administrative costs of a bank, a variable beyond the 
purpose of this study. 
The market will then be reluctant to show a demand for financial debt when the 
difference between the credit spread on the assets and the credit spread on the 
issued debt (respectively             and        ) is too small. A market confident 
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reader would argue at this point that the market will adjust the price, i.e. the 
CDS level, to make sure that a certain supply for debt will find a price where to 
clear. Financial debt though is not like any other good, due to its systemic 
relevance and to the link implicitly existing with real economy. High yielding debt 
can be sustainable only via high yielding assets: this is at odds with low growth 
economies7, typically made of firms with low ROE (on average), thus not capable 
to afford high interest rates on loans and credit granted by the banking sector.  
When management cannot issue debt with an appropriate maturity the tenor of 
liabilities is shortened, in the attempt to reduce the cost for securing liquidity: 
this leads to increase the risk that even higher amount will have to be issued in 
the future, with a significant risk that supply in the future be not met by 
available demand. 
In a more analytical framework the market evaluates the financial sustainability 
of assets and liabilities by comparing financial revenues and costs to be 
associated to the current stock of assets and capital structure. It is reluctant to 
subscribe financial debt if 
     [                  ]       [               ]                           
                  
Where k is to be interpreted as a minimum return on assets after costs. If we 
divide both sides by the amount of assets, then 
5 
                        [               ]                              
Where      is the percentage of assets financed by debt issuance, 
    
    
 , and      is 
the percentage of assets financed by a stock of deposits. The relevance of these 
ratios is not only emphasized here, but also common market reports consider 
the importance of “Loans to deposit ratios” when publishing relevant summary 
statistics. The condition above can be rewritten as  
                                                             
7 The financial crisis experienced since 2007 is mainly located in highly developed countries, where 
it proves impossible to sustain a high cost of debt given the low growth of underlying economies. 
We do not consider here scenarios of high inflation. 
21 |L i q u i d i t y  M a n a g e m e n t  a n d  C D S  e v o l u t i o n  i n  2 0 0 8 - 2 0 1 3  
 
6 
                   [       
 
    
]  [               ]                      
        
Where we have defined      
    
    
 , i.e. the leverage factor in the balance sheet. 
Some important aspects to note at this stage are the following. The simple rule 
of a minimum profitability of the banking sector so that debt issuance may have 
a clearing price ultimately depends from a number of important variables. We 
will briefly comment on some of them 
i. d(t) or the depreciation of assets is a random variable whose values are 
particularly high during economic crisis. Particularly high values could see 
the condition above satisfied. 
ii. λ(t) is introduced in static terms as a ratio; in a previous work the author  
has explored its endogenous character and its dependency on the 
evolution of the credit market. During a financial crisis, leverage increases 
due to the drop in value of the assets8. 
iii.            and its evolution compared to        : Both these variables can 
be approximated, from an empirical point of view, as a moving average. 
The former is the moving average over the last              of a basket of 
the most liquid CDS traded, with no distinction for the industrial sector 
where the reference entities belong to. The latter is a moving average 
over the last        years of all CDS whose reference entities are financial 
institutions. The reason why we look at a financial index rather than the 
CDS of one issuer only is because the financial crisis is affecting the entire 
banking sector and conclusions for a specific issuer could be biased by the 
specific situation and events proper of one financial institution only.  
 
  
                                                             
8 This aspect is explored in length in “Optimal Capital structure of a bank: the role of asymmetry of 
information and Equityzation of debt” 
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Credit indices: Evolution and Impact on the Profitability of the Banking 
Sector 
This brief section aims at describing the evolution of CDS in recent years, for the 
purpose of providing an intuition on the higher costs of the financial sector in 
managing their liabilities, compared to a small increase in the yield of the assets 
(for their portion redeeming, hence rolled with higher yields). It is evident that 
even if assets and liabilities were due and rolled in the same amount, then the 
increase of the Itraxx financial senior since 2008 means a drop in profitability of 
the banking sector (if the index can be considered as a proxy for the cost of 
liabilities and the yield of assets may be represented by the index Itraxx Europe 
Main9). This is witnessed by the substantial decrease in the net Interest Margin10 
of the banking sector, ultimately leading to a downgrade of profit forecast and to 
the unattractiveness of the financial sector for investors. We have assumed 
above that the actual profit for a bank depends on the evolution of a backward 
looking average of CDS. Also the cost of liabilities is backward looking, since 
liabilities still due at time t may have been issued various years ago. From an 
empirical point of view it is easier to observe the evolution of the CDS with no 
average over past years, in the understanding that the number of years to look 
back for liabilities is typically lower than the number of years required for the 
assets11. Hence we have that a higher cost of debt issuance, even if matched by 
an identical move on the yield of assets available in the market, affects 
negatively the Net Interest Margin of the bank and reduces profits. If instead the 
rise in financial CDS is higher than the movement in non financial CDS we can 
conclude a fortiori that such scenario is negative for the banking sector, even 
without considering that the effective cost of liabilities depends (likewise for the 
assets) on a backward looking average. The more such move (rise in the 
difference between financial and non financial CDS) takes place, the more likely 
it is that the market may move towards a state described as “no clearing price 
for debt”. 
                                                             
9 More detail on the composition and the rationale of construction of the indices is provided in the 
empirical section and the appendix of this work. 
10 Net interest margin (NIM) is a measure of the difference between the interest income generated 
by banks and the amount of interest paid out to their lenders, relative to the amount of their 
(interest-earning) assets. It is similar to the gross margin of non-financial companies. 
11 Due to the transformation of maturities proper of the banking balance sheet, we would expect 
that assets are financed with shorter dated maturities liabilities. Hence the Rolling speed of 
liabilities is typically higher on liabilities, if compared to the assets.  
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Figure 1:Financial senior index evolves to levels superior to Itraxx main, thus confirming that 
liabilities for the financial sectors are turning more expensive than the rise in yields of the assets. 
The graph above (source: Bloomberg) shows indeed that the financial CDS 
(white line) has evolved, since 2010, drastically higher than the average of all 
Most liquid CDS. Figure 1 plots the evolution of the European (Euro 
denominated) indices in the family of Itraxx Indices. Itraxx financial senior 
(white line) and Itraxx Main Europe (red line) are here considered representative 
of, respectively, the average cost of the liabilities for the European banking 
sector (to be added to Euribor rates) and the average yield of the assets for a 
diversified pool (Itraxx Main is to be added to Euribor, too). Descriptions of such 
Indices are in the appendix. 
 
Liabilities Rolling during a Financial Crisis 
Every year some previously issued bonds are due for redemption. During 
ordinary times it would be realistic to assume that financial markets would 
determine a price for the new issuance so that demand is equal to supply. 
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We have determined that high debt interests may reduce the trust in the 
banking sector; hence management may be forced to plan the evolution of the 
capital structure with limited or no recourse to debt issuance. 
The general constraint is 
                                
For the sake of simplicity we assume that deposit will not change from one year 
to another and that there will be no rights issuance12. Hence 
                    
                     
                              
Hence the minimum 13 amount to issue at time t, is equal to 
7 
                                           [         ] 
Such minimum amount to issue is immediate to interpret: further debt issuance 
is required for the debt due for redemption at time t; it is decreased by the 
assets redeeming their capital (in the amount which was not eligible for 
refinancing with central bank); new issuance is also required for the non eligible 
portion of new investments. 
During last four years there were various periods when no issuer could approach 
the primary market14, a fact described within this framework as “debt markets 
not clearing conditions”. In light of these difficulties management may be forced 
to set         equal to zero or to start a deleverage program, which in most cases 
                                                             
12 Even if we assumed that in a financial crisis Deposit reduced their amounts, then results would 
not change substantially.  The reader could also argue that a variation in equity is produced by 
Profit/losses realized. To make the analysis consistent with a variation in equity due to losses or 
profit realized within the period, then we would not change the main conclusions of this work. In 
periods of financial crisis the profits are very low if not negative (losses): hence, if anything, the 
conclusions are even stronger when we derive the minimum amount of debt to issue compatible 
with the equilibrium in the evolution of the balance sheet. 
13 Management could issue more debt than such minimum, for various reasons: for prudential 
reasons or because it forecasts that soon too many redemptions will be due. 
14 As in all definitions of primary markets, here the primary market for financial debt is the market 
that changes the supply and introduces new debt freshly issued by the bank. The secondary 
market is where such debt, along with all existing (and older) issues trade at so called “secondary 
market price”. 
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requires that the bank accept to sell assets at discounted value: indeed the 
market will determine the value of an asset also computing a liquidity premium, 
due to the structural search of liquidity and to the supply of illiquid credit from 
the banking sector. 
Until this point we have analyzed all variables from a financial point of view, in a 
framework that makes an attempt to model evolution of assets and liabilities 
through time. From a broader perspective         equal to zero is ultimately a 
reaction of the banking industry which transmits a deleverage system to the real 
economy: a central bank is thus losing control of the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy. A crunch in financial liabilities is generating a credit crunch 
immediately transmitted to the real economy. 
 
Event of Default and Maturity Gap 
A default is typically defined as the event that the value of the assets be lower 
than the value of liabilities. In a scenario characterized by non clearing market 
conditions, then the deleverage impulse is such that the condition of default, 
which relates to the value of assets, cannot even be assessed due to the illiquid 
prices of loans & receivables. When the debt market cannot achieve a clearing 
price for financial debt, then condition for default is that liabilities can no longer 
be rolled or just redeemed. Market players, in scenario of not clearing price for 
financial debt, scrutinizes the distribution of maturities for debt issued until that 
date. 
We define  
         ∫       
 
   
   
so that at time t the bank faces in the next s years an amount of debt to redeem 
equal to               
We define also 
          ∫         
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so that at time t the bank faces a natural reduction in assets in the next s years 
(due to redemptions) equal to              . 
We also define a random variable          which represents the percentage of 
losses (due to impairment, defaults and deterioration of the loans and 
receivables portfolio) on the aggregate      occurring from time t until time t+s. 
Then managing liabilities from time t until time t+s means imposing that the 
minimum issuance required from time t until time t+s,          , 
                                                   [                 ] 
Default is the event 
                                                   [                 ] 
The maturity mismatch typical of the banking sector is such that liabilities have a 
shorter maturity than assets. In terms of the framework here adopted, this 
translates into 
                             
Hence if financial markets were operating in the scenario of “no clearing 
conditions for financial debt”, then             and as a consequence 
management sets            ; then the default condition would be 
8  
                          [                 ] 
This condition of default emphasizes that the typical mismatch in maturities run 
by a bank between assets and liabilities implies that a default takes place in case 
of closure of the market for debt issuance. We will explore the central bank 
reaction below via a change in the parameter ρ. 
The reader may argue that these strong conclusions find mitigation with the 
consideration that bonds are eventually subscribed by the banks customers, i.e. 
sold to retail. The industry indeed makes a strong differentiation between retail 
and wholesale issuance. For the purpose of this model, bonds issued to retail 
should represent a percentage of the aggregate here denoted as D(t). Retail 
customers accept a lower yield in view of their limited information and 
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knowledge. Their wealth, be it under the technical form of Deposits or retail 
bonds, tends to be a stable liability of the bank which, for this reason, is 
categorized under the form of deposits in this simple framework of liabilities 
management. 
Central Bank reaction 
When the market moves towards no clearing conditions in the financial debt 
market, then the central bank is forced into action to avoid a major liquidity 
restriction (practitioners typically refer to “credit crunch”) in the banking and 
real sector. 
Central bank then evaluates the possibility of relaxing refinancing parameters to 
avoid a default. 
We have already analyzed that when the market scrutinizes the capability of the 
banking sector to roll liabilities, then probability of default in the next s years 
may be written as15 
9 
 {                                                   [                 ]} 
During a financial crisis risk aversion and the attempt by management to 
decrease the probability of default encourages to choose            , especially 
when experiencing severe stress due to the difficulty to issue and place new 
financial debt. On the other hand a period of distress requires that policy makers 
intervene with accommodative measures: monetary policies rely, for the 
transmission mechanism of accommodative inputs, on the banking system, 
which, instead, is transmitting a restrictive output16. 
The central bank then reacts to the estimated probability of default (in the 
formula above) by changing the parameter   to  ̃. 
On one side the central bank needs a functioning transmission mechanism, 
which requires a low probability of default; on the other lowering such 
                                                             
15 Here P{.} denotes the probability of an event. We will not specify any probability distribution; 
adding formal introduction of such Probability function does not add strength to the conclusions of 
this study. 
16             is indeed the failure of transmission in monetary policy since an accommodative 
monetary input (central banks are intervening for the survival of the system) turns into a 
deleverage signal to the economy (A(t) decreases). 
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probability of default moves credit risk from the balance sheet of the bank to the 
central bank balance sheet17.  
If the primary market for financial debt is completely inactive (as per conditions 
of no clearing price for financial debt), then the expected value of           is 
zero and the central bank is called to set ρ as a tool of monetary policy. For 
             and a change of monetary policy from   to  ̃, then probability of 
default is 
10 
 {                          [                 ]         ̃    } 
Such a definition of event of default shows the crucial role of liquidity:   ̃     is 
the amount of liquidity injected in the system (as a percentage of assets) by 
monetary policy.  
The last probability of default well summarizes the conclusion of this work (to be 
tested empirically in the econometric section below): probability of default 
decreases with high level of liquidity injection chosen by central bank (and 
viceversa). 
Hence the author will move now to an empirical approach aimed at assessing 
such linkage between financial CDS levels and amount of liquidity existing in the 
system. If confirmed by data, such relationship will emphasize the transmission 
mechanism existing from monetary policy to CDS levels of financial institutions. 
Liquidity may also be seen then as a tool to avoid default, hence with an 
immediate consequence on financial CDS. In this light a high level of the CDS of 
financial institutions is to be interpreted also as an unhealthy transmission 
mechanism. A central bank may then intervene to make sure that the level of 
liquidity is such that failure to pay is not met on a daily level due to a liquidity 
shock. 
Probability of default will approach zero for  ̃ sufficiently high: a monetary policy 
made in terms of rules on eligible collateral rather than changes in interest rates 
                                                             
17 The central bank, compelled to lower the probability of default of the banking system, will see 
the size of its balance sheet increase: sometimes central bank interventions are measured by the 
amount of the assets on central bank balance sheet (evaluated as a  proportion to GDP) 
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does depict current years, where tenor of refinancing and enlargement of criteria 
to identify admissible collateral are key variables in monetary policies. 
If a linear regression could explain the level of the index of financial CDS by 
means of variables explanatory of liquidity we could then exclude that financial 
CDS are pricing a default risk due only to idiosyncratic insolvency reasons. We 
could then conclude that financial CDS price the probability of default due also to 
a liquidity crunch, possibly arising from the effort to roll liabilities.  
If such conclusions were deemed acceptable, a central bank should consider that 
only certain values of CDS are affordable by the banking sector. After a certain 
threshold, then the debt market can no longer clear and the central bank has to 
lower the value of CDS moving some leverage on its balance sheet, at least 
temporarily. It does so primarily by relaxing the refinancing parameters and by 
extending the maturity of such financing. 
 
Meaning of Liquidity 
Financial markets see the banking sector as one player across the wide range of 
institutional agents: the banking sector is active on bond issuance (supply) in 
various currencies; it is also buyer of various securities and participates to the 
repo markets with two main purposes: yield enhancement and liquidity 
management. 
Liquidity is typically a concept relating to the efficiency of a particular market. In 
this work we mean instead the cash position of the banking sector, meant as 
sum of cash reserves and credit lines available to pay for any kind of obligation: 
be it a cash versus settlement obligation (upon purchase of a bond, for 
example), or to face payment of capital/interest on outstanding self issued 
bonds. As such, liquidity is not an observable variable. Recently it has become 
the centre of attention for regulators and for management: yet financial market 
players can only make an inference on its level by observing variables 
presumably highly correlated with the evolution of liquidity. 
Such variables, which we will briefly comment on, are 
i. Difference between Euribor and Eonia 
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ii. Level of CDS of a sovereign issuer versus the actual yield of the bond 
issued by the same issuer. 
iii. Levels of the cross currency swap EUR/ USD. 
iv. The difference in yield between inflation linked and nominal bonds, issued 
by the same entity. 
 
Inference on Liquidity by Few Financial Variables 
In this paragraph we provide the rationale why the variables listed above are 
deemed relevant estimators for the purpose of investigating the liquidity 
aggregates available to the banking sector.  
Euribor and Eonia are two indices that are considered respectively proxies for 
the interbank deposit rate for maturities respectively 3 months (e.g. 3-month 
EURIBOR) and 1 day, in case of Eonia. These parameters have daily fixings and 
a longer maturity is the reason for different rates especially in scenarios of high 
risk aversion. In a world where the health of the banking system is not 
questioned then we would expect that such difference be stable and not large. A 
negligible magnitude of such difference and a low volatility (of the latter) were 
features of the financial markets prior to 2007. The degree of financial distress is 
typically summarized in industry research and ECB papers18 by means of graphs 
summarizing the evolution of such difference. The picture below is included in 
the work by Michele Lenza, Huw Pill and Lucrezia Reichlin published in the 
working paper series released by ECB. 
                                                             
18 See for example “Monetary policy in exceptional times”, October 2010, in working paper series 
no 1253. 
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Figure 2: from “monetary policy in exceptional times”, ECB working paper series no 1253 
In this study we deem the difference between Euribor and Eonia as one of the 
variables to infer on the liquidity available in the system. We use, though a more 
forward looking measure of it, since we do not necessarily need to make 
inference on the liquidity available for one day only, but we investigate what the 
market estimates on the average evolution of liquidity for a horizon of 2 years. 
This approach reduces also the Fixing risk, i.e. the risk that the analysis may be 
misleading since some days may enter the sample with particularly high values 
due to a shock in liquidity which is 1 day only specific. 
Financial markets quote the fixed rates financially equivalent to floating 
parameters for almost any tenor via swaps markets. These markets have proved 
reliable even during the core of the financial crisis. Hence rather than the 
difference on one day between Euribor and Eonia, we will analyze the difference 
between the swap rate equivalent to the parameter Euribor and the swap rate 
equivalent to the parameter Eonia. Both swap rates are considered for maturity 
2 years and we thus obtain a measure forward looking at the evolution of 
liquidity for the next 2 years. The reason why we consider the tenor 2 years is 
32 |L i q u i d i t y  M a n a g e m e n t  a n d  C D S  e v o l u t i o n  i n  2 0 0 8 - 2 0 1 3  
 
simply because swaps with 2 years maturity are exchanged in very large 
Notional Amounts, therefore making available data very reliable. 
The second variable we will analyze to make inference on the liquidity of the 
banking sector is the difference existing between CDS of a sovereign state and 
the yield of securities issued by the same sovereign state for a maturity similar 
to the tenor of the CDS. 
Whereas CDS reflect the actual risk of default, the securities exchanged in the 
market have a demand which depends not only by the risk-return trade off, but 
also by the liquidity available in the system. Furthermore credit default swaps 
are unfunded transactions, i.e. no upfront payment is required at inception 
(which makes their values not dependent by liquidity constraints of market 
agents)19. Bonds purchases instead require the payment of the price. It is 
intuitive that for large amounts of liquidity there will be a higher amount of 
investments into securities as opposed to the synthetic purchase by selling 
protection on Sovereign CDS. More importantly it is a fact that the CDS market 
and the securities market are segmented, i.e., for various reasons, a market 
player participating in the cash market may not participate into the CDS Market. 
Hence whereas CDS do reflect mostly the risk of default, then the cash market, 
compared to the CDS, is also driven by the liquidity available in the system. 
The difference between CDS and the yield of the bond with same tenor would 
not be very meaningful for sovereign states where the market does not generate 
a high number of transactions: for this reason (and the plethora of securities 
existing) we select an issuer whose debt is traded very actively. Among others 
we will consider the CDS whose reference entity is Republic of Italy and issued 
securities will be BTPS or “Buoni Poliennali del Tesoro”. We will consider the 
most traded maturity for CDS, 5 years, and we will compose a basket of BTPS 
whose average maturity is 4.5 years20. We will be cautious in considering BTPs 
when monetary policy intervenes on the secondary market to stabilize prices: on 
                                                             
19 As a result of the standardization of CDS contracts, the premium running may be different from 
the CDS levels. Such difference originates a difference of NPV which is settled upfront. Such 
amount is typically negligible if compared to the notional of the CDS and therefore the market 
activity on CDS cannot be considered affected on scarcity/ abundance of liquidity  
20 The reason why we build a basket of 4.5 years and not 5 years (to match the maturity of CDS) 
is purely technical: the new issuance targets typically the benchmark 5 years(among others), 
hence on the day of issuance there would be a jump from the basket to the newly issued bond, 
which typically trades at premium to encourage investors to new subscriptions. This jump may 
bias the econometric analysis. 
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that particular period we would have prices affected by the central bank 
interventions. This explains why for the second part of the sample we present 
more than one regression, both adopting and discarding the  Italy basis as a 
regressor: on one hand we wish to produce results comparable with the first part 
of the sample; on the other we fear that the central bank intervention may bias 
the meaningfulness of the regression. Once we drop the Italy Basis, we will 
consider instead the Germany basis, which instead cannot be considered in the 
beginning of the sample since CDS on Germany was traded very rarely before 
2009. 
The third variable we will use in the effort to make an inference on the liquidity 
available for the financial system is the level of cross currency swaps quoted in 
the market. A cross currency swap is a derivative instrument where 2 parties 
exchange a principal amount at inception and at maturity21, denominated in 2 
different currencies. The parties exchange interest payments on the two 
different currencies. If the 2 currencies were EUR and USD, then the 
counterparty paying USD principal at inception would receive libor and pay 
Euribor plus the so called “cross currency basis”22 for the life of the swap. In 
practice the cross currency swaps are quoted in terms of spread over the 
benchmark rate for the leg other than USD. In simpler terms the market 
deviates from a theoretical value of zero and the party paying a benchmark rate 
plus a positive spread is receiving, on the initial exchange of notional, a currency 
with a structural higher demand than the one paid at inception of the swap. In 
intuitive terms, during periods of financial crisis foreign currency denominated 
liabilities may be even more problematic to manage (and roll) than domestic 
currency denominated ones. Hence some issuers sometimes address their 
demand for foreign currency by tapping into the cross currency market. This 
market allows them to exchange foreign currency with domestic currency. This is 
achieved by entering a swap where the bank receives foreign currency at 
inception versus paying domestic currency (initial exchange of notional). This 
initial transaction is reversed at maturity of the swap; during the life of the swap 
parties exchange interest on the notional borrowed.  
                                                             
21 So called initial and final exchange of notional. 
22 Or “Cross Currency Level” 
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The last variable introduced for the purpose of inferring on the available liquidity 
in the market is a comparison between yields of instruments issued by the same 
entity and for similar maturities. In particular we will compare debt paying a real 
rate with debt paying a nominal rate. The government bonds market allows such 
a comparison: some bonds redeem simply at 100% of the notional amount 
(nominal bonds), whereas the so called inflation linked bonds redeem 100% of 
the notional amount, adjusted for the inflation between issuance and maturity of 
the latter. Clearly inflation linked bonds pay a lower coupon since the inflation 
balloon is due at maturity in addition to the notional (nominal) amount. This 
technical feature causes the inflation linked bonds to be traded at prices higher 
than a nominal bond, with identical or similar maturity. 
The reason why we investigate on the difference of yields offered by these 2 
instruments is due to the different conditions applied by the central bank and the 
repo market when the holder of these securities uses them as collateral for 
refinancing purposes. The ECB, for example, applies different haircut for nominal 
and inflation linked bonds, making the financing of the latter characterized by a 
higher haircut. For this reason, scarcity of liquidity will be inferred when the 
difference between the yield of these securities will increase, given that there is 
not enough liquidity to finance an inflation linked bond in spite of the extra yield 
offered with respect to the nominal bond of similar features (maturity and 
issuer). 
For this reason we will consider the magnitude of the z-spread differential 
existing between inflation and nominal bonds. We will analyze such difference for 
two issuers: the Republic of Italy and the French Tresor. 
More specifically we will term “Italian z-spread differential” the difference 
between the z-spread of the BTPS 2.1 15-Sep-2017 and the z spread of the 
BTPS 5.25 01-Aug-201723. The z-spread is the number to add to 6m euribor 
such that the future flows of the bond, when summed and discounted at 6m 
euribor + z-spread are equivalent to the price of the bond. 
                                                             
23 More detail on the z-spread and the bonds in the appendix 
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Similarly24 we will define the “France z-spread differential” the difference 
between the z-spread of the bond FRTR 1 25-Jul-2017 and the bond FRTR 3.75 
25-Apr-2017.  
We will analyze if we can find a meaningful relationship between the Itraxx 
Index of financial CDS and the 4 variables just presented (as instruments to 
make inference on the liquidity of the banking sector). 
 
Description of the Data 
As anticipated, we will test some of the conclusions drawn in this study against 
daily data. We will describe the composition of the data and then mention the 
results. The appendix will provide further detail. 
The data is composed by a database of daily observations, for the period 
elapsing from 30th of June 2008 until 28th of June 2013. We emphasize that this 
sample contains the entire data history representing the financial crisis, with 
inception before the Lehman collapse and the government financial crisis 
experienced more recently. Such database includes the event of the Private 
Sector Involvement (PSI)25 in relation to the bonds issued by the Hellenic 
Republic and the bailout of the Spanish banking sector. 
Such database includes 
1. The levels of the index Itraxx Europe, with tenor 5y maturity: the index, 
also known simply as 'The Main', is composed of the most liquid 125 CDS 
referencing European investment grade credits, subject to certain sector 
rules as determined by the IIC and also as determined by the SEC. More 
specifically, The iTraxx® Europe index comprises 125 investment grade 
rated European entities selected from the Liquidity List26. All entities must 
                                                             
24 We will provide more details about the specific bonds and the definition of the z-spread in the 
appendix. For the moment it may be considered the additional yield over 6 months Euribor  that a 
bond offers 
25 Friday, 24th of February 2012 (announcement date) 
26 The Liquidity List is broadly defined in terms of trading volumes. For the precise definition of the 
composition of the Liquidity List , the reader may refer to the Markit iTraxx Europe Index Rules, 
available on the web site http://www.markit.com/assets/en/docs/products/data/indices/credit-
and-loan-indices/iTraxx/ 
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satisfy the membership determination criteria27. Among such criteria it is 
disposed that the final index comprises 125 entities and is constructed by 
selecting the highest ranking entities in each sector  on the Liquidity List, 
subject to the following sector restrictions:  
a) 30 Autos & Industrials  
b) 30 Consumers  
c) 20 Energy  
d) 20 TMT  
e) 25 Financials  
 
2. The levels of the index Financial Senior (more properly iTraxx Europe 
Senior Financials), with tenor 5y maturity, which intuitively includes all 
financial senior CDS of reference entities (and listed in the appendix, for a 
particular series of the Index). More specifically, this index is the weighted 
average of the 25 names belonging to the Financial sector and included in 
the index Itraxx Europe (as per description above, point e).  
 
Both Itraxx Main and Itraxx financial Senior will be considered within 2 
subsamples: as time goes by the baskets of CDS shorten their maturity. 
In order to compare variables (bonds and CDS) with a similar maturity, 
the subsamples are built to make sure that the residual maturity of the 
indices does not fall below 3 years. Hence after 2 years from inception of 
the sample data, we will still consider the Itraxx indices, but we will 
replace the original basket (with 3 years maturity after 2 years), with a 
new one with 5 years maturity. Such new baskets with 5 years CDS will 
represent a new “Series” and this is the reason why the regressions will 
refer to Series 9 and Series 13, respectively basket of 5 years CDS in 
March 2008 and March 2010 
 
3. The yield of a basket of securities with average maturity 4.5 years of BTPs 
(issued by the Tesoro Italiano), FRTR (issued by the France Tresor), DBR 
(issued by Republic of Germany). From such yield we obtain the Par Asset 
                                                             
27 Membership determination criteria are listed on the documents available on the web site as per 
previous footnote: among others such criteria refer to the requirement of investment grade 
according to Fitch, Moody’s or S&P. Entities with an Entity Rating of BBB-/Baa3/BBB- 
(Fitch/Moody's/S&P) with negative outlook or below are excluded. 
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swap level, via comparison with the swap rates with maturities similar to 
the securities.  
 
4. The level of the 5 year maturity CDS contract with reference entity 
Republic of Italy, Republic of Germany, French Republic, all quoted on 
Dollar notional. 
 
It is important to notice that the CDS traded on Republic of Germany had 
negligible amounts traded prior to 2009, thus making this data not very 
meaningful prior to 2009. For this reason we will make use of this variable 
only for the sub-sample with dates after 2009.  
 
5. The swap (fixed) rate with 2 years tenor quoted versus the floating rate 
eonia 
 
6. The swap (fixed) rate with 2 years tenor quoted versus the floating rate 
euribor 6m 
 
7. The cross currency spread for a tenor of 5 years, on EURO/USD, with 
initial and final exchange of notional 
 
All CDS levels and Indices are sourced from a Markit Database, whereas all 
remaining variables are sourced via Bloomberg. 
 
CDS: Liquidity Shortage or Structural Insolvency? 
The ultimate purpose of the study is to explain the daily variations of the index 
iTraxx Europe Senior Financials in terms of liquidity-related regressors and one 
more variable representing the component of credit risk which cannot be related 
to liquidity only. At the beginning of this chapter a model was presented arguing 
that, when Debt market no longer clears, then liquidity plays a primary role in 
defining the event of default.  
Under market not clearing conditions, probability of default for a bank can be 
represented as (equation 10 above) 
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 {                          [                 ]         ̃    } 
From such probability we deduce that an empirical analysis should aim at 
measuring if the conditions of liquidity affect the level of CDS (hence the 
probability of default) of financial institutions. Indeed, for high degree of 
intervention via liquidity injections, probability of default decreases (high level of 
 ̃ make the event less likely). 
The contribution of this work is in not limiting itself to an analysis of the 
evolution of risk of default specific of one country only. The systemic risk 
extends cross borders and the econometric analysis presented below does not 
analyze a default risk which is idiosyncratic (specific of one or few institutions 
only). In this view we implement an econometric analysis that aims at explaining 
the default risk of an entire basket of financial issuers, where the latter are all 
investment grade. For all these reasons the linear regression we will analyze is 
                                       
Where  
i.         is the level of the index Itraxx financial Senior at time t (we will 
consider daily differences) 
ii.            is a variable reflecting the level of credit for reference entities 
belonging to the  non-financial sector (we will consider daily differences) 
iii.               is a vector of variables apt to infer on the liquidity level at time 
t (we will consider daily differences). 
We move with a view that liquidity is a systemic variable: its shortage affects an 
entire economic area. Limited appetite of the market in subscribing senior and 
even secured issuance has been witnessed especially during the second half of 
2011 for over one year: we will then expect that the role of liquidity in 
explaining the daily variation of CDS will be more relevant in the second part of 
the sample. We will comment below that not only the linear coefficients increase 
their magnitude in the second part of the sample, but also all regressors aiming 
at explaining the liquidity are estimated with better levels of significance and the 
adjusted R squared improves. 
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In detail we will estimate the linear regression above on 2 periods, selected so 
that the Itraxx Indices are not analyzed with a residual maturity less than 3 
years: the data contemplates Series 9 from June 2008 to June 2010 and Series 
13 from June 2010 until June 2012. For the sake of comparison we will keep the 
regressors identical across these 2 subsamples: 
                                                                    
Where  
        is the daily change of the Itraxx Financial Senior (9
th series in the sample 
from  30-Jun-2008 to 28-Jun-2010, for 464 days; 13th series in the sample 
obtained 30-Jun-2010 to 28-Jun-2012, for 481 days)  
      is the daily change of the Itraxx Non financial index (9
th series in the sample 
obtained from  30-Jun-2008 to 28-Jun-2010 , for 464 days; 13th series in the 
sample obtained 30-Jun-2010 to 28-Jun-2012, for 481 days) 
      is the daily change in the Italian Basis 
      is the daily change in the French Basis 
      is the daily change in the Italy z-spread differential 
      is the daily change in the Euribor – Eonia basis. 
      is the daily change in the level of the EUR/USD Cross currency (tenor 5y) 
      is the daily change in the France z-spread differential. 
The results of the regression confirm the main intuition that CDS levels for 
financial entities may be decomposed into a “principal” credit level summarized 
by the non financial world (Itraxx Non Financial), regressor with the highest 
explanatory power and an estimate with significance at 1%. This is confirmed by 
both regressions on the 2 subsamples. The relevant relationship existing by CDS 
of financial institutions and Non financial ones is also well documented in the 
empirical results of Ejsing and Lemke, as mentioned in related literature section 
and commented below. 
The liquidity variables, when analyzed from the 30th of June 2008 until the 28th 
of June 2010 will have all significance of 5%, making an exception for the Italian 
basis (with a p-value of 8.8%), the Italian z-spread differential (with a p-value 
of 9.4%) and the France z-spread differential (with a p-value of 22.5%). The 
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regression on this particular sample gives an R squared of 53%. More details 
and statistics are provided in the appendix. 
One of the liquidity variables, the z-spread differentials (computed for France 
and Italy) analyzed from the 30th of June 2010 until the 28th of June 2012 will 
show a poor explanatory power. In particular their significance deteriorates 
across the 2 samples: the Italy z-spread differential moves its p-value from 
9.4% to 36.9%; the France z-spread differential moves its p-value from 22.5% 
to 37.4%). In light of these results the z-spread differential variables seem to 
have a poor explanatory power across the years of the sample and therefore 
they add little value to the analysis. The remaining liquidity variables instead 
confirm their explanatory power across the two subsamples, all with a 
significance at 5%, with the exception for Euribor-Eonia basis, with a p-value of 
5.7%. The regression achieves an R Squared of 60.6% (from 53%), thefore 
improving its explanatory power, as expected, in the second part of the sample. 
What would happen if we extended this latest regression (from  June 10 until 
June 12) for one more year, to June 13? We would be then considering 
(although for a minority of data points) that the Itraxx indices would have a 
residual maturity of less than 3 years. Such sample extension would also allow 
to assess if the variables, tested on the most turbulent times in recent financial 
history, would preserve their explanatory power also during the latest 
“normalization” period. If that were the case, then the intuition presented in this 
work would prove robust not only when tested across the different cycles of the 
crisis, but also to the evolution towards normalization experienced so far. When 
the sample is extended from 481 to 717 business days (30th of June 2010 to 28th 
of June 2013) the adjusted R Squared improves slightly, from 60.6% to 63.2%; 
all variables in the regression improve their significance and most of the 
explanatory power is still represented by the Itraxx Non Financial Index. We will 
provide more details in the appendix. 
A comparison across the 2 samples (June 08-June 10 versus June 10-June 12) 
may shed further light on the two periods so far analyzed: we will analyze the 
change in the linear estimates for variables with significance at 5%. The 
estimate for the dependence to the Itraxx Non Financial Index shows that before 
2010 one bp of movement of Itraxx Non-Fin was corresponding, according to the 
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econometric results, to less than 1 bp movement for Itraxx Financials. In the 
second subset of the sample, the coefficient doubles (1 bp of movement for 
Itraxx Non Fin corresponds to 1.4 bps of movement for the Itraxx Financial 
Index). 
The Italian basis increases its weight, although not significantly, while the French 
basis loses relevance: the latter reduces its estimate from 0.43 to 0.145: the 
absolute amount of the estimate is still higher than the one associated with the 
variable Italian basis, yet the evolution across subsamples would suggest that 
liquidity may have affected significantly more the Italian market of government 
bonds, when compared with the French one. 
The coefficient estimated for the Euribor-Eonia basis evolves from 17.9 to 38.32 
(both numbers are negative): this is consistent with the primary issuance 
market being inactive for lack of appetite to subscribe new issuance. This is the 
event described in the section above “No Clearing Price For Debt”, which implies 
the urgency for all issuers to tap into alternative sources of liquidity to fill the 
funding need no longer manageable via senior debt issuance. This could explain 
why issuers have tapped into the interbank unsecured deposit market, accepting 
to pay a much higher premium (than historical ones) for longer tenor with 
respect to overnight maturities. Hence the higher sensitivity of the Itraxx 
Financial Senior to higher levels of the difference between Euribor and Eonia 
(such difference, again is read in terms of swap rates with tenor 2 years, in 
order to isolate the econometric analysis from daily fixings which could be one 
day only specific). 
The event of no clearing conditions on the primary market for Debt issuance 
may be a valid reason why issuers may have tapped into the cross currency 
market when the scarcity of funds was particularly binding on a specific 
currency: the estimates in the linear regression (relating to the cross currency 
basis for EUR/USD) evolves from -0.15 to -1, which provides support to the 
conclusion that from 2010 European issuers (the ones included in the Itraxx 
Financial senior Index) may have accepted to tap into the  cross currency 
market while experiencing higher CDS levels (hence presumably higher risk 
adversion from the market to underwrite senior debt risk and higher funding 
costs).  
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Various papers explore the relationship existing between financial sector and 
government CDS: this work has taken a different route, by explaining the 
evolution of Financial CDS via CDS of the non financial sector and some liquidity 
factors. Some of the liquidity factors include government CDS, but only as a 
measure of relative value with respect to nominal government bonds (in terms 
of basis towards the asset swap level of the bond matching the maturity the 
CDS). In this respect this work presents conceptual differences with respect to 
the results of Ejsing and Lemke who emphasize the explanatory power of the 
Itraxx Non-Financial Index in the linear regression where dependent variables 
are government CDS. Not only this empirical section was derived on daily data, 
but the aim of this work is providing a further variable apt to explain the 
evolution of Financial CDS, for the portion not explained by Non-Financial CDS. 
In the appendix we will add further details on the statistics relating to the linear 
regressions commented so far. We will dedicate the remaining part of this 
section to some variations that may enhance the quality of the data in the 
second part of the sample. We have already provided the reason why the data 
adopts two series of the Itraxx indices and why this has caused the econometric 
analysis to be split into two subsamples. The second subsample also covers a 
period of central bank intervention on the market, aiming at providing some 
buying support against selling waves of government bonds. A reader could argue 
that the variables here adopted as regressors and determined in terms of BTP 
levels on the secondary market could be biased by central bank interventions. In 
order to address this concern we will consider, among the regressors, the 
German Basis in lieu of the Italian Basis. 
We will preserve the logic behind this work and explain the evolution of CDS 
levels for financial issuers by adopting a different set of “liquidity variables” that 
were not affected by secondary market intervention. Also, we will reduce the 
number of regressors by discarding the z-spread differential, given the poor 
explanatory power achieved in the regressions so far presented. 
More specifically we will consider the regression: 
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Where  
        is the daily change of the Itraxx Financial Senior (13
th series)  
      is the daily change of the Itraxx Non financial index (13
th series) 
      is the daily change in the French Basis 
      is the daily change in the Euribor – Eonia basis. 
      is the daily change in the level of the EUR/USD Cross currency (tenor 5y) 
      is the daily change in the German Basis 
By analogy with the terminology so far adopted, German Basis is the difference 
between the CDS on Germany (for a maturity of 5years) and the par asset swap 
of the securities (issued by the Republic of Germany) composing a basket whose 
average maturity is 4.5 years. 
This linear regression contains less variables than the ones discussed so far (5 
regressors versus 7). Yet it achieves a superior fitting of the data, both on the 
period 2010-2012 (484 observations) and the period 2010-2013 (730 days). We 
will comment upon such results and provide further detail in the appendix. 
The regression on the period 30 June 2010 until 29 June 2012 provides an 
adjusted R squared of 63.8%, while the longer period 30 June 2010 until 29 
June 2013 achieves an adjusted R squared of 64.6%. The improvement in the R 
squared in spite of a longer sample is a feature emphasized even in the linear 
regressions not adopting the German Basis as a regressor. The intuitive 
explanation may be that an average of CDS levels with shorter residual maturity 
is less volatile and therefore, in spite of the longer sample, a better fit is 
achieved. 
The new regressor, the German Basis, is estimated in both linear regressions (2 
years data and 3 years data) with a significance at 1%. Also, we notice that the 
logical approach dominating this empirical analysis, where we are testing for the 
explanatory power of liquidity variables on CDS referencing financial institutions, 
holds even when we change regressors. Indeed the linear estimate for Itraxx 
Non Financial Index is not only significant at 1%, but the magnitude of the 
estimate is similar in spite of adopting a different set of regressors. In the period 
30 June 2010 until 29 June 2012 such estimate is 1.3 (5 regressors including 
German Basis) or 1.4 when adopting 7 regressor with the Italian Basis. In 
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intuitive terms had we noticed very different estimates, then we would doubt the 
argument that a change in CDS level can be split into 2 separate components: a 
non financial world related change (Itraxx Non Financial Index) and a change in 
liquidity (remaining regressors). The fact that the role played by the Itraxx Non 
Financial Index is very similar across the 2 regressions (both on the sample 30 
June 2010 until 29 June 2012) justifies the search for variables apt to infer on 
factors different than pure credit risk. This work argues that variables apt to 
infer on the liquidity in the system may provide explanatory value on the 
evolution of CDS levels for financial institutions. Two different regressions 
provide on the same time interval a similar conclusion on the liquidity variables: 
in spite of the different regressors the Itraxx Non Financial Index preserves a 
constant explanatory power across different linear regressions.  
Can we state a similar conclusion when analyzing the sample 30 June 2010 until 
28 June 2013? Even in this case the linear estimates are very similar (1.4 with 5 
regressors including the German Basis and 1.5 with 7 regressors not including 
the German Basis). One more feature to emphasize in the regression adopting 
the variable German Basis is that out of five regressors, three are estimated at 
significance 1%, and 1 at significance 2% (respectively Itraxx Non financial 
Index, Eur/Usd cross currency level, German Basis and French basis). We 
therefore conclude that replacement of Italian basis (estimated at significance 
2%) with German Basis (estimated at significance 1%) has not worsened the 
goodness of the fit and has confirmed the explanatory power of government 
bonds basis onto the CDS level for financial institutions. We also conclude that z-
spread differentials between inflation linked bonds and nominal bonds with 
identical issuers do not prove relevant when explaining the evolution of CDS 
levels of financial institutions. 
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Conclusions 
This chapter analyzes financial CDS behavior in their daily evolution during the 
most turbulent times after the Great Depression. It provides explanatory 
variables for financial CDS which ultimately map into the concept of liquidity 
available to financial institutions. Such liquidity is relevant to interpret the 
evolution of CDS, which suggests that the credit risk of financial institutions is 
also a macroeconomic variable rather than a microeconomic topic only. As such, 
the central bank may find it optimal to intervene with extraordinary measures of 
monetary policy to guarantee the survival of the system and to control the 
monetary transmission via the banking system. 
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APPENDIX 
Details and results of the regressions 
Regression 
                                                                    
For  
i. Range: 01-Jul-08 until 28-Jun-10 (465 Days) 
ii. Itraxx Indices as per series 9 
 
Regressors:  
      is the daily change of the Itraxx Non financial index  
      is the daily change in the Italian Basis 
      is the daily change in the French Basis 
      is the daily change in the Italy z-spread differential 
      is the daily change in the Euribor – Eonia basis. 
      is the daily change in the level of the EUR/USD Cross currency (tenor 5y) 
      is the daily change in the France z-spread differential.  
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Regression 
                                                                    
  For  
i. Range: 30-Jun-2010 until 28-Jun-2012 (Days: 481) 
ii. Itraxx Indices as per series 13 
 
Regressors:  
      is the daily change of the Itraxx Non financial index  
      is the daily change in the Italian Basis 
      is the daily change in the French Basis 
      is the daily change in the Italy z-spread differential 
      is the daily change in the Euribor – Eonia basis. 
      is the daily change in the level of the EUR/USD Cross currency (tenor 5y) 
      is the daily change in the France z-spread differential. 
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Regression 
                                                                    
For  
i. Range: 30-Jun-2010 until 28 28-Jun-2013 (Days: 717) 
ii. Itraxx Indices as per series 13 
 
Regressors:  
      is the daily change of the Itraxx Non financial index  
      is the daily change in the Italian Basis 
      is the daily change in the French Basis 
      is the daily change in the Italy z-spread differential 
      is the daily change in the Euribor – Eonia basis. 
      is the daily change in the level of the EUR/USD Cross currency (tenor 5y) 
      is the daily change in the France z-spread differential. 
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Regression 
                                                    
For  
i. Range: 30-Jun-2010 until 29-Jun-2012 (Days: 484) 
ii. Itraxx Indices as per series 13 
 
Regressors:  
y_fin (t) is the daily change of the Itraxx Financial Senior  
x_1 (t)  is the daily change of the Itraxx Non financial index  
x_2 (t) is the daily change in the French Basis 
x_3 (t) is the daily change in the Euribor – Eonia basis. 
x_4 (t) is the daily change in the level of the EUR/USD Cross currency (tenor 5y) 
x_5 (t) is the daily change in the German Basis 
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Regression 
                                                    
For  
i. Range: 30-Jun-2010 until 28-Jun-2013 (Days: 730) 
ii. Itraxx Indices as per series 13 
 
Regressors:  
y_fin (t) is the daily change of the Itraxx Financial Senior  
x_1 (t)  is the daily change of the Itraxx Non financial index  
x_2 (t) is the daily change in the French Basis 
x_3 (t) is the daily change in the Euribor – Eonia basis. 
x_4 (t) is the daily change in the level of the EUR/USD Cross currency (tenor 5y) 
x_5 (t) is the daily change in the German Basis 
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Composition of the Itraxx Financial senior 
As mentioned above the Itraxx Financial senior is a simple average across a 
number of CDS levels. Such average is determined with equal weights and the 
CDS names (reference entities) composing such average are:  
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Composition of the Itraxx Main 
As mentioned above the Itraxx Main Europe is a simple average across a number 
of CDS levels. Such average is determined with equal weights; the CDS names 
(reference entities) composing such average are (series 9): 
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As mentioned above the Itraxx Main Europe is a simple average across a number 
of CDS levels. Such average is determined with equal weights; the CDS names 
(reference entities) composing such average are (series 13): 
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A glance to the evolution of monetary aggregates 
If this section we propose a reading of the implications of a transmission 
mechanism failing to transmit accommodative monetary inputs: in spite of a 
central bank injecting liquidity in the system, the banking system does not 
expand credit to the economy: as a result the correlation between growth of 
different monetary aggregates decreases during financially turbulent times. The 
picture below shows the evolution of the rate of growth of the aggregate 
M1(white line), M2 (red line), M3(yellow line) and inflation in Euro Area (green 
line)28. In this case we only have monthly data, hence we will not explore the 
time series of these aggregates in length. It is important to note that before the 
financial crisis, until 2006, the aggregates had a decent correlation, higher than 
2008, when the European central bank intervenes with a growth of M1 rarely 
experienced before, yet not accompanied by a similar evolution of M2 or M3. 
Surprisingly the growth of M3 is below the rate of inflation (green line), which 
means that it is growing in nominal terms, but shrinking in real terms. 
 
FIGURE 3: EVOLUTION OF MONETARY AGGREGATES THROUGH TIME. 
                                                             
28 Source: Bloomberg 
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The effort to inject liquidity is not only represented by the effort of central banks 
considered individually in their monetary policy management: an example is the 
joint monetary policy intervention as described below by the press release 
available on the web site of all central banks on the 30th of November 2011 
(below an extract of what published by the Board of Governors of the Federal 
reserve System29): 
The Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, the European 
Central Bank, the Federal Reserve, and the Swiss National Bank are today 
announcing coordinated actions to enhance their capacity to provide liquidity 
support to the global financial system. The purpose of these actions is to ease 
strains in financial markets and thereby mitigate the effects of such strains on 
the supply of credit to households and businesses and so help foster economic 
activity.  
These central banks have agreed to lower the pricing on the existing temporary 
U.S. dollar liquidity swap arrangements by 50 basis points so that the new rate 
will be the U.S. dollar overnight index swap (OIS) rate plus 50 basis points. This 
pricing will be applied to all operations conducted from December 5, 2011. The 
authorization of these swap arrangements has been extended to February 1, 
2013. In addition, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, the European Central 
Bank, and the Swiss National Bank will continue to offer three-month tenders 
until further notice. 
As a contingency measure, these central banks have also agreed to establish 
temporary bilateral liquidity swap arrangements so that liquidity can be provided 
in each jurisdiction in any of their currencies should market conditions so 
warrant. At present, there is no need to offer liquidity in non-domestic currencies 
other than the U.S. dollar, but the central banks judge it prudent to make the 
necessary arrangements so that liquidity support operations could be put into 
place quickly should the need arise. These swap lines are authorized through 
February 1, 2013. 
                                                             
29 Available in its entire content at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20111130a.htm 
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CHAPTER 2:  
RISK MANAGEMENT AND CAPITAL 
STRUCTURE TESTING WITH  LIMITED 
INFORMATION 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter presents a simple multi-period model representing the 
refinancing risk posed by the maturity gap existing between assets and 
liabilities. This is only one of the risks to be managed within the functioning of a 
bank. In this chapter we aim at extending the analysis to multiple risks, with no 
prior categorization, in a context of limited information. 
Limited information derives from acknowledging that the assets are not 
observable in their evolution of value, not only due to non liquid market for each 
asset contained within the balance sheet, but also due to their representation via 
accounting rules, which may differ from a logic of “market price”. 
We will necessarily ignore a number of assets/ variables specific of one bank 
only and assume the existence on balance sheet of a number of liquid variables 
whose values can be monitored daily. 
This approach entails a risk management ignoring idiosyncratic factors and we 
will further summarize the liquid variables via principal component analysis. 
Being these liquid variables exchanged in financial market, this work opens a 
methodological separation between market and idiosyncratic risk management. 
We will deal only with the first one. 
The question stemming from this approach relates to how much relevant data is 
missed when a risk management skips the idiosyncratic information of a balance 
sheet: that depends on the period under observation, since within a certain 
timeframe market events may prevail on idiosyncratic variables; on some other 
occasions the main risk is represented by variables specific to each bank. In the 
former case, then, market variable represent the bulk of the risk, whereas in the 
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latter case market variables may represent only a minor portion of the risk to 
manage. 
For these reasons this approach to risk management may reveal powerful during 
periods of financial turbulence, strongly affecting the banking sector, like the 
financial crisis unfolding in the years 2008-2012.  
In the awareness of the incomplete set of information adopted in the sample, 
next chapter will investigate how much explanatory power a risk management 
derived from market variables may have on the actual liabilities of the bank.    
If market variables have a good explanatory value on the liabilities of a sample 
of banks, then we are effectively dealing with the concept of Systemic risk. If the 
banking sector is well represented by a selected sample of banks, then the 
possibility to explain the evolution of their liabilities via the same market 
variables suggests that such variables provide the starting point for defining a 
risk shared by all banks, hence systemic. Such analysis will be presented in next 
chapter which will also propose a transmission mechanism for systemic risk.  
This chapter ultimately defines a risk management method and analyses how 
the risk of the assets is translated into volatility of the liabilities; therefore it 
must stand the test of the past literature which emphasized many flaws of risk 
management, especially in light of the current financial crisis. Therefore such 
new risk management has to prove robust to a number of questions, briefly 
mentioned below. 
What is the role of accounting in banks’ risk management? Could accounting 
distort management from choices which add economic value in favor of others 
that preserve accounting value as represented by Financials? 
Are risk weights a satisfactory measure of risk on balance sheets? Is it 
methodologically valid to associate a risk weight to one asset, independently 
from the composition of the balance sheet? 
These questions are at the heart of the topics under debate during current 
financial crisis. They also summarize most of the criticism towards risk 
management as implemented in current days. Hence in proposing a new method 
of risk managing the bank, the author cannot avoid acknowledging these 
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questions: they represent a strong test to make sure that the foundations of this 
Risk management method does not fall back into the flaws that literature has 
already identified.  
This work will be based on an empirical approach, with extensive use of the 
statistical tool of Principal Component Analysis. 
 
Literature on the Topic 
Literature on Risk Management may be divided into various strands, to be 
distinguished by content and chronologically.  
Especially before the inception of the 2008 crisis, the most relevant contributions 
on the theme of risk management had its theoretical foundations commonly 
associated with the names of Markovitz, Sharpe, Fama, Samuelson. We deem 
redundant to describe the theories of Efficient Markets, CAPM and Portfolio 
Selection; they compose the “Modern Portfolio Theory”. 
Mainly after the inception of the latest financial crisis, a second strand of the 
related literature has analyzed what went wrong in risk management and in its 
theoretical foundations, both from a theoretical and regulatory point of view. The 
most recurrent theme is the difficulty of dealing with Tail events, or “Black 
swans”, in the metaphor of Nassim Nicholas Taleb. He also mentions, among 
others, the usage of quantitative risk methods (Var) over heuristic methods; and 
the lack of accountability of the individuals involved in risk-bearing. A different 
approach in reviewing the flaws of risk management emphasizes the role of 
systemic risk; Lehar (June 2003) uses stock market information and estimates 
the joint dynamics of banks’ asset portfolios for a sample of international banks: 
via a Monte Carlo simulations the author estimates the joint probability of 
default of banks within the sample. Acharya, Pedersen Philippon and Richardson 
(May 2010) present a model to quantify systemic risk where the contribution of 
a financial institution is measured via its Systemic Expected Shortfall, i.e. the 
event of being undercapitalized when the whole system is undercapitalized: the 
authors propose a taxation based on such measure so that such externality is 
internalized within the financial institution. Modelling systemic risk has proved a 
challenge for academia and practitioners: Bisas, Flood, Lo and Valavanis produce 
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“A Survey of Systemic Risk Analytics”, thus providing an analysis of 31 
quantitative measures of systemic risk in the economics and finance Literature. 
We will analyze this particular branch of the literature and its number of 
quantitative measures of systemic risk in next chapter, specifically dedicated to 
the philosophy, definition and state of the art relating to the fascinating topic of 
systemic risk. The author has opted for postponing the discussion on this 
literature since presenting first the risk management model will help in 
emphasizing the conceptual differences and novelties compared to the systemic 
risk analytics already established by the most relevant authors on the theme.  
Risk management and Capital Management for banks are highly regulated fields: 
hence a third strand of literature analyzes the content of the regulatory 
innovations known as “Basel III”. As a result, Risk Management and Capital 
Management have adopted rules of accounting and have implemented 
International Financial Reporting Standards as per regulator’s requirements. 
Also, in the definition of capital and liquidity requirements the new Basel III 
regime is imposing criteria and addressing specific guidelines on composition of 
assets and liabilities. The result is that capital management becomes the tool to 
be compliant with the new regime, described in the document: “Basel III: A 
global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems”. A 
field of research focuses on how Basel III plays a role in risk assessment, 
measurement and how it affects banks’ and customers’ portfolio selection and 
performance. Iannotta and Pennacchi investigate on the form of moral hazard 
where the current framework of Capital required for investments may lead banks 
to take excessive systematic risk. Some literature focuses on the flaws of such 
regulatory approach: Carmassi and Micossi (2012, CEPS) emphasize that Basel 
solvency ratios are not easy to read, fail to identify weak banks and fail to take 
account of systemic risk. This work contributes on this point by proposing a new 
definition of Risk weights, fully deduced by the introduction of a new concept of 
Risk Management. Within the new definition of regulatory capital the literature 
produces examples of alternative securities candidates for the purpose of being 
admissible in the “Additional Tier 1 Capital” as per Basel III approach: Pennacchi 
introduces, analyzes and values a new form of contingent convertible: COERC 
(Call Option Enhanced Reversed Convertible). This work contributes in this 
particular aspect by defining a new methodology to define capital shortage: 
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based on that next chapter will derive a proposal for subordinated debt. On the 
theme of Liquidity the publications range from regulators’ opinions (Tarantola, 
2008) to models of Liquidity Risk Management (Brunnermeier and Yogo, 2009) 
proposing a model of liquidity risk management in which a firm is subject to 
rollover risk.  
A forth strand of literature elaborates on the principles to be respected for laying 
the foundations of a more mature Risk Management: Golub and Crum list and 
describe in detail eight lessons from the credit Crisis. Via a more quantitative 
approach Attilio Meucci (2011) presents the Prayer, a recipe of ten sequential 
steps for the risk management of portfolios with no restrictions in terms of asset 
classes allocation and investment horizons.  
 
This and the following chapter are closely related, hence a list of references for 
the main contribution on the theme will be at the end of the two sections. 
 
Market Variables and Idiosyncratic Variables 
Different accounting rules applied to the various balance sheet items of a Bank 
make the estimate of the value of assets a challenging task. A sum over the 
balance sheet values of the assets would produce a biased estimate of the total 
assets with respect to the value estimated by financial markets: recent years 
have shown that only a small portion of the tangible book is reflected in the 
stock price of a bank. 
Hence, we will introduce some assumptions on the assets of a bank. The focus of 
this work is not so much to estimate the absolute levels, but the variation in 
time: an effective risk management needs at its foundations a model that can 
well describe the evolution in time of the assets. 
This work assumes that the assets of a bank may be split into 2 categories: 
market variables (MV) and idiosyncratic variables (IV). We will assume that the 
latter are independent from the former. The main difference between these 2 
categories is that the latter are not observable with daily frequency and and in 
most cases are known only to the management of the bank. In light of the aim 
of this work, proposing a framework to risk manage (with limited information) 
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the risk of the assets, we will focus on the Market variables (MV). In our 
assumptions, once we denote the assets by A, 
 
11               
The market variables assumed to be on balance sheet for a sample of European 
banks will be presented below; the author prefers to comment on each to share 
the rationale for their choice.  
One of the most difficult items to estimate in a bank’s balance sheet is the 
portfolio of credit granted by the bank: its illiquidity justifies the difficulty to 
evaluate such portfolio. The bank holds the credit until maturity and monitors 
the quality of the borrower with specific knowledge of the customer. If there are 
no arrear payments the bank will mark the credit at face value and, regardless 
of the evolution in credit market, its price will not change. Such balance sheet 
price may substantially differ from the purchasing price given by a third party, 
which instead will reflect, among other factors, the probability of insolvency and 
the general market appetite for credit portfolios. Granting credit to the economy 
is the core activity for a bank, hence we may expect that this illiquid portfolio 
represents the main portion of the banks’ investments. We may consider 3 main 
categories when defining the portfolio of credit: residential mortgages, 
commercial credit (performing) and non performing credit.  
Residential Mortgages and government risk: Although prices for mortgages 
portfolio are not liquid, prices for bond issued by banks and guaranteed by 
mortgage portfolios (covered bonds) are instead quoted by the market. Whereas 
a bond issued by any financial institution is priced according to the credit quality 
of the issuer and with respect to the secondary market price of an existing (and 
similar) bond previously issued, such reasoning does not apply to Covered 
Bonds. Covered Bonds30 are indeed backed by (mainly) residential mortgages, 
which ultimately guarantee for interest payments and redemptions in case the 
bank is no longer solvent. Covered bonds are priced as a spread versus the most 
                                                             
30 An exhaustive definition of covered bonds is beyond the scope of this work and we invite the 
reader to explore the number of publications on the topic. In essence Covered Bonds are bonds 
issued by the bank and guaranteed by a pool of segregated residential mortgages. Such guarantee 
is a credit quality enhancement: hence market prices covered bonds for similar maturities with a 
premium (positive or negative) to government securities (benchmark). 
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liquid benchmark for debt in their own jurisdiction: government bonds of similar 
maturity. The purchase of a covered bond exposes to the credit worthiness of 
the covered pool of residential mortgages, dynamically replenished when 
defaults and redemptions cause a value reduction. Indeed covered bond over-
collateralize the nominal value (i.e the amount to redeem) by Prime residential 
mortgages: this is why pricing primarily reflects the risk of the covered pool of 
assets, more than the risk of the issuer. Covered Bonds trade at a variable 
spread with respect to government bonds; hence their variation in value can be 
decomposed into 
a) Variation of the yield of the government bond for similar maturity 
b) Variation of the credit spread of the covered bond with respect to the 
credit spread of the government bond adopted as “benchmark” 
In light of this reasoning, yield of Residential mortgages will be approximated by 
the yield of government securities (for the same country where mortgages are 
granted). We will therefore, for simplicity reasons, neglect point (b) above. 
Although these assumptions may be disputable, the author considers them not 
misleading for the purpose of modelling daily variations of value. Hence we 
introduce the following assumption: 
Government and residential mortgages risk will be represented by the yields of 
the main European sovereign issuers (European since the method here proposed 
will be applied to data for European banks in next chapter), for maturity of 4.5 
years: 
i. Yield of government bonds issued by Germany (Denoted as 4.5Y Smooth 
GER) 
ii. Yield of government bonds issued by Italy (Denoted as 4.5Y Smooth ITL) 
iii. Yield of government bonds issued by Spain (Denoted as 4.5Y Smooth 
ESP) 
Once we have represented the portion of assets allocated into government risk 
and Mortgages, remaining assets may be represented as a diversified pool of 
credits. We will make use of very liquid indices belonging to the Itraxx family, in 
order to obtain proxies for a diversified portfolio of (performing) credit. We will 
also insert proxies for not performing credit, although the author acknowledges 
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that the actual composition of the bank’s credit portfolio may be more 
concentrated than these indices, depending upon the expertise and the knowhow 
of the bank in lending to particular sectors and regions of the economy. 
Credit Risk: We will then represent the market variables component of the credit 
portfolio of a bank by adopting diversified indices of CDS, the Itraxx Main Europe 
and Itraxx Crossover. The reason for such choice of representation is that once 
we exclude mortgages, government bonds and Cash, the remaining portion of 
assets is allocated into a diversified portfolio of credit. The latter will be 
performing for its main portion and a subset will instead deteriorate in its credit 
quality. Hence the performing portion of credit will be approximated by Itraxx 
Main Europe, which by definition comprises 125 equally weighted credit default 
swaps on investment grade European corporate entities (the composition and 
description will be in the appendix). We approximate the non performing 
portfolio with the Markit iTraxx Europe Crossover index since it comprises 50 
equally weighted credit default swaps on the most liquid sub-investment grade 
European corporate entities.  
Exposure towards the banking sector: we will also represent the exposure a 
bank may have towards the banking sector via the liquid index Itraxx Financial 
Senior, which includes 25 liquid CDS levels with reference entities European 
financial institutions (more detail in the appendix). Similarly, we will select one 
more variable representing the exposure towards the subordinated financial 
debt: not only may some investments be allocated on subordinated debt, but a 
representation of the risks on the asset side should include at least two layers of 
the banking sector capital structure. The subordinated debt liquid variable will be 
represented by the Itraxx Financial Sub Index, which is composed by the same 
reference entities as the Itraxx Financial Senior; with the difference that the 
reference obligations are Subordinated bonds, rather than senior ones. 
Interest Rate risk: We will also add to the variables swap rates (with 10 years 
tenor, having as underlying the floating parameter Euribor and Eonia) in order to 
introduce pure interest rate risk in the sample. 
The table below summarizes the choice of market variables assumed to be on 
balance sheet (and the risk they represent); we will denote such liquid variables 
as vi, for i= 1,2,..,9. 
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TABLE 2: LIQUID VARIABLES TO BE ANALYZED VIA PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS 
 
 
PCA Risk Management Applied to Market Variables 
We will analyze this set of variables to investigate, under a principal component 
analysis, the definition of risk. In other words, when dealing with so many 
variables the bank would run risk suboptimally if it ignored the correlation across 
such portfolio and if it contemplated managing risks one by one. Principal 
component analysis defines, from historical data, the principal factors of risks 
explaining most of the variance of the assets. We will denote such Principal 
Components of Risk as PCR. 
The principal component analysis run on 2 years of data31 shows that the 
variables may be summarized in only 3 principal components, for the 
representation of a significant part of the sample variation. In particular, we 
report below the composition of the first 2 principal components and the 
percentage of the sample variance associated to each principal component. 
 
 
                                                             
31 The source of this data is Bloomberg for the first 5 variables and the Markit database. 
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FIGURE 4: LOADINGS OF THE FIRST 2 PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS FOR A PCA RUN ON 492 DAYS 
From the results of the principal component analysis we then define the principal 
components of risk (PCR): 
12 
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We will report a more detailed analysis in the appendix; α(i) represents the 
loading of each variable v(i) in the definition of PCR. The loadings are 
summarized in the picture above and in the table below:  
TABLE 3: WEIGHTS DEFINING THE PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS OF RIKS (OCT 2010-2012) 
 
 
Interpreting PCR and Implications for Risk Management 
PCR stands for principal component of risk; the results above suggest that 86% 
of the movements realized over 2 years may be summarized by a risk manager 
only by 2 principal components (linear combination of the variables listed 
above). From the sign of the weights we may understand from a risk 
decomposition perspective which variables move together; the absolute 
magnitude of the loading factor signals the importance of the variable for the 
purpose of the definition of the Principal Component of Risk.  Principal 
component 1 emphasizes that the world sees a strong correlation across the 
world of credit and government yields other than German government risk. The 
first principal component (PCR1) may be summarized as a “Credit versus the 
joint movement of Rates and German yields”, since rates and German 
government bonds move in the opposite directions if compared to all other 
variables. In a second scenario, recurring less frequently (principal component 
2) and independently (statistically, from PCR1) the index Crossover behaves 
differently from what described in the first PCR: its level may decrease while the 
yield of Spain may increase. 
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The risk manager can then reduce the number of variables to manage from 9 to 
3: this reduction in the number of variables leads to a negligible loss of sample 
variance. Principal Components are independent, which allows the risk manager 
to address them separately. 
Next question relates to capital structure: who bears all the variance produced 
by the portfolio of assets? How is it distributed across equity and debt? Can 
volatility of the assets explain the volatility of equity? We will explore the theme 
of capital structure below, when running specific econometric assessments on 
PCR based on a sample of European banks. 
Every bank may consider adding to this framework all the relevant 
(idiosyncratic) information that would make the analysis more specific when 
approximating the market value of the assets of the specific bank. 
It is immediate to identify the bold differences between a regulatory and a PCA 
Approach: the first defines the risk factors and their relevance by the adoption of 
Risk Weights. Principal Component Analysis analyzes the behavior of assets and 
provides fewer risk factors: it then restricts the attention from a plethora of 
variables to very few. 
Leverage or deleverage policies can then be implemented by looking at risk 
factors primarily. Deleverage is ultimately a reduction on Balance Sheet 
Variance: being the latter explained in terms of PCR, deleverage ultimately can 
be rephrased as the reduction of exposure to PCR. Thus deleverage can also be 
achieved if financial markets quote derivatives on (some of) the principal factors 
identified by PCA. We will introduce in next chapter a specific example on how to 
originate a new set of liabilities with the purpose to reduce balance sheet 
variance. 
The rationale leading this work is quite simple: we introduce assumptions on 
some assets on a bank’s balance sheet. We then run a Principal component 
analysis and derive that the extraordinary volatility experienced in recent years 
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can be decomposed into few principal factors; we will also derive that such 
factors also have a strong explanatory power on CDS32 and equity levels. 
We will then derive that an observable variable, CDS of financial issuers, is much 
more than a mere derivative contract quoted by the market: its variance may be 
linked to the volatility of assets, even for the portion not disclosed by published 
financials. 
CDS and balance sheet variance33 will prove central in the definition of risk 
management of the bank; standard balance sheet representation of the bank 
avails itself of a realized set of costs and revenues. We are then facing two 
opposite approaches: accounting well reflects the status quo, or, better, the past 
status, i.e. what occurred; financial markets instead require an assessment on 
balance sheet soundness for the future and in relation to the turbulent times we 
have experienced in the years 2009-2012.  The appendix also contains the 
results of the PCA when a shorter sample is considered and an economic 
intuition of such results; furthermore the appendix analyzes if a change in the 
sample produces major changes in the definition of Principal Components of 
Risk. 
 
Capital Management (Regulatory Approach) and Implications for Risk 
Management 
Management faces then a decision: a volatile world requires active balance sheet 
management especially in the format of Variance management: the number of 
stress tests taking place during the financial crisis is the demonstration that the 
market needs reassurance on the balance sheet strength of the banking sector. 
If it is immediate to agree upon the need of managing risk, it is not so trivial to 
choose a model of risk management.    
In particular, when financial markets question balance sheet strength, the reply 
is often addressed in regulatory terms showing what would happen to Core Tier 
1 Ratio under certain assumptions of stress test. Addressing balance sheet 
                                                             
32 When referring to CDS and equity level, we will consider the CDS and the stock price of the bank 
running risk management. When instead we refer to CDS of other reference entities we will be 
explicit or refer to indices. 
33 We will denote balance sheet variance as BSV below. 
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strength in terms of regulatory measures, like Tier 1 ratio, is equivalent to the 
adoption of a regulatory model for the assessment of the balance sheet 
soundness and for the purpose of running risk management34. In essence such 
model is based on a notion of equity, or core capital, equal to the raised capital 
and the sum of past profits35: the limitation is that past profits are a pure 
accounting measure. More simply, if a loss is not realized, it does not participate 
to the computation of the yearly profit: hence it does not affect the computation 
of Core Capital. This is relevant, for example, for the book of Loans and 
Receivables36, which contains most of the credit originated and represents for 
the majority of banks the most relevant book (by dimension) within the assets. 
In the regulatory framework such a notion of capital, which allows for latent 
losses, is the buffer for risk. Risk instead is defined as a fraction of the assets. 
Such fraction is named “Risk weight”. Risk weighted assets are the sum of all 
assets, multiplied by their respective risk weight. If we try to read the rationale 
behind it, a risk weight may be interpreted as the loss (in percentage points) 
that could be realized on such asset: such loss would imply a deduction from 
capital37. Once we consider the ratio between the Core Capital as previously 
defined (denoted as CT1) and the Risk weighted assets (denoted as RWA) then 
we obtain the leading indicator (in a regulatory world) of balance sheet strength. 
    
   
   
 
Given that the numerator is an accounting measure of capital, it may 
substantially differ from a credible capital measure from the viewpoint of 
financial markets: in other words market capitalization of a bank may be a 
percentage, sometimes even well below 100%, of the book value; and it may 
even be below the Core Tier 1 Capital of the bank. Such a difference clearly has 
many reasons to exist: one of them is that the market believes too many assets 
are marked on balance sheet above their market value, hence the value of the 
                                                             
34 Here the terms of Risk Management also includes the notional of Capital Management given that 
risk ultimately affects, with gains and losses, the consistency of capital. 
35 We are exposing a reductive rationale behind the construction of Core tier1 ratio, sometimes 
with an oversimplification meant to address more effectively the questions of this work. 
36 The accounting treatment of the assets in the category “Loan and Receivables” is compliant with 
the rule of amortized cost, hence only an impairment would decrease the value during the life of 
the assets.  
37 This rationale holds well for the majority of assets, whose risk weight is below 100% 
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bank quoted in terms of market capitalization, is much lower to the “Tangible 
Value” deduced from the balance sheet. 
The importance of the risk weights is then crucial given that the numerator is 
purely an accounting measure: from a methodological point of view an asset 
whose losses may not be deducted from capital unless realized should not 
receive a zero risk weight unless there is absolute certainty, especially at a 
regulatory level, that any future decline in value of the asset will be only 
temporary and led by demand supply dynamics rather than fundamental reasons 
of deterioration. 
From a capital management point of view an asset whose fall in value would 
never contribute to a decrease of the numerator and never increase the 
denominator is an asset with infinite return on (regulatory) capital: if its cost of 
financing is lower than the yield of the assets, then management has an 
incentive in choosing such investments in large notional (maybe ignoring the 
actual volatility of the asset), especially when operating in a context of high 
scrutiny of regulatory ratios and poor profitability. Indeed such asset is simply 
disregarded until default (or impairment) from capital considerations. 
The author believes that Capital Management from a regulatory point of view 
should not be confused with a Capital Management oriented to the creation of 
value for shareholders. As mentioned before, at least two variables will be 
crucial when proposing a framework to run a modern risk management: the set 
of PCR and BSV (Balance Sheet Variance). Next chapter contains a proposal for 
a new definition of risk weights, consistent with the role of PCR in describing 
risk. 
 
Assumptions on the Value of Debt 
If management considers the maximization of return for shareholders a priority 
then CDS and BSV play a relevant role. Given the leveraged nature of the banks, 
costs for interests on debt is a central variable in determining profit for current 
and future years.  The author models the cost of debt as determined by38 Euribor 
                                                             
38 Although Euribor is a parameter commonly used for Euro denominated issuance, Euribor in this 
work should be considered as the interbank offer rate for funds over a certain short horizon (for 
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+ CDS. CDS is the credit default swap quoted by the market whose reference 
entity is the bank itself; admittedly, the actual levels where the bank may issue 
its debt may be different from Euribor + CDS: the primary market will determine 
a premium to the current outstanding bonds’ yields for subscribing the new 
issuance. This is not necessarily linked to CDS levels; yet, when we analyze the 
aggregate bond issuance and the variations in cost for servicing the debt, the 
CDS is a good and readily available proxy. The reader may argue that most of 
the bond issuance is subscribed by retail; therefore analyzing CDS may be 
misleading. Yet, even in this case, the analysis should be based on the 
opportunity cost of debt and not on the actual cost. Modeling debt as paying 
Euribor + CDS makes the evolution of debt observable with daily frequency. 
 
Exploring the Capital Structure via PCA Risk Management 
It is evident to the reader that the term risk management is adopted with a wide 
meaning by also including Capital Management: in the author’s opinion only a 
unified frame may bring together 2 sides of the same coin: risk ultimately has to 
do with capital, since a high balance sheet variance will eventually require 
capital to absorb potential negative realizations. 
The rationale of this work until now can be summarized as follows: banks 
operate on balance sheets whose volatility of assets may be significantly 
underestimated by Financials. Accounting may not prove a good model to 
estimate the risk represented by assets, primarily because it was not conceived 
for managing risk. The author proposes an approach merging the intuition of the 
critical market variables to manage (management is supposed to have a view 
and a deeper knowledge of the balance sheet assets) with a statistical approach 
(principal component analysis) in order to identify the main factors of risk (from 
the former variables). 
Clearly running a PCA on the assets of a bank requires a strong modeling effort; 
therefore we introduce a number of assumptions and decide to disregard the 
idiosyncratic component of the assets. In this framework, where market 
variables can be scrutinized in their evolution in value, Risk management should 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
example 3 months), across a panel of financial institutions of primary standing, with no restriction 
on the currency of funds. 
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derive the main risk factors and focus on the management of very few variables: 
the few that have the highest explanatory power on the variance of assets, or, 
as per previous notation, PCR. 
PCR(s) may be considered the main building block of risk in terms of liquid 
variables traded in the market. Risk management may consider such variables 
when hedging risks, aiming at choosing hedging policies which reduce the 
variance of the assets.  
This framework may find its limit in the error of approximating the behavior of 
assets by means of market variables. This is the reason why, once obtained the 
PCRs from liquid (and approximating) variables, they must be validated in their 
explanatory power. 
We denote by D the stock of debt of the bank (market value) and by E its value 
of equity.  
13 
                     
              
It is intuitive at this stage that, if PCR have explanatory power on the liabilities 
of a bank, then the model may be considered reliable for the purpose of 
managing market variables. More importantly, if PCA risk management proves 
reliable, then it also allows insights on the evolution and soundness of the capital 
structure. This and next chapter will investigate on the economic and statistical 
significance of the explanatory power of the PCRs onto the evolution of debt and 
equity. 
This work has introduced some assumptions on the assets since their market 
values are not disclosed within financials. On the liability side, instead, we may 
derive from the CDS level the representative market value of all senior debt, in 
terms of its daily variations; the market capitalization of the bank is obtained by 
the stock value quoted on the stock exchange39. Deposits are typically 
guaranteed and subject to first call reimbursement, hence for the purpose of this 
work their variance (of their value) will be deemed equal to zero. Before the 
                                                             
39 We may also introduce the CDS for subordinated debt as representative of the stock of 
subordinated debt: this will not change significantly the conclusions of this work. 
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PCR’s are tested in their explanatory power, we will model the evolution of 
capital structure via a state variable (  
 ), representing the intrinsic value of 
equity, i.e the mere difference between Assets and liabilities. In case of adverse 
evolution of the assets (dropping in value), then such state variable may reach 
negative levels. Should that be the case, the value of equity is still nonnegative, 
given that its value equals the value of a call option with underlying the value of 
the assets (and strike the nominal value of liabilities). The state variable turning 
negative is equivalent to the event of the bank running on negative capital, 
hence strongly undercapitalized. 
14 
  
      
      
The value of   
   is imposed identical to E0, i.e. the raised capital when the bank 
was founded. This modeling of the state variable, of Debt and Equity (and 
corresponding assumptions) is conceived only for analysis of daily variations: 
therefore ΔAt is the variation of assets which is not attributable to an increase of 
leverage obtained, for example, by debt issuance with proceeds meant to 
increase the amount of assets. 
The introduction of such State Variable also allows modeling the value of debt, 
which is identical40 across periods if the state variable is positive. In case the 
evolution of the intrinsic value of equity turns negative, then such negative value 
will be deducted from the value of debt. Indeed, in case of immediate liquidation 
when   
   , then the value of equity would be zero and the value of debt would 
be recovered with loss equal to the amount of the state variable. 
15 
             {  
   } 
The equation above suggests that if the daily variation of assets had a 
satisfactory explanatory power on Debt, then that might be considered evidence 
that the bank may be undercapitalized. 
PCA risk management offers a tool to model the evolution of assets due to 
market variables only. We will use that model to derive a test for the soundness 
                                                             
40 We are considering the variations in value of debt not attributable to a change in interest rates 
and/or redemptions. 
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of the capital structure of a bank: a very simple methodology can be based on a 
test of hypothesis. This represents a departure from the regulatory model, based 
mainly on the computation of the Tier1 Ratio and deeming equity adequate if 
such ratio is higher than certain thresholds.  
From Equation (3) we can impose that, for β=1,  
                  
We can further decompose the variation of assets as the variation of the values 
of the principal components of risk plus an independent (by construction) 
variable from PCRs. The full variation of assets within a certain period is given 
below, once we denote by L the variable summarizing the sample variance 
disregarded as a result of representing the market variables only via principal 
components.  
16 
                    
IV is independent (by assumption) from MV=L+PCR and L is independent from 
PCR (by construction of principal components). We will rewrite (3) above as   
17 
                             
Where β = 0 in case of a well capitalized banks, thus meaning that all variations 
of assets are reflected into equity. This is true for a bank whose value of assets 
is by far higher than the amount of liabilities. If that is the case the equity is a 
very in the money call (when viewed as an option with strike price the value of 
liabilities) and therefore its value is almost linear in the underlying (assets).  
PCR Capital Adequacy Test: We will consider the regression 
18 
                     
 
Let H0 be the event that the bank is well capitalized (β=0), then H1 is the event 
of the bank being undercapitalized,    . This is ultimately a significance test 
and the rejection of the null hypothesis takes place for absolute numbers of the 
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t-statistic higher than the values corresponding to a selected probability of type I 
error.  
Next chapter will apply this methodology to a sample of European banks. The 
variation in the value of assets will be modeled by considering the daily 
variations of the Principal Component of Risks as introduced in this chapter. 
Therefore the capital adequacy test will effectively be run against market risk, 
skipping the idiosyncratic risk of the bank. Conclusions therefore that a bank 
may be seen as solid for the behavior of its equity has to be mitigated by the 
consideration that this work analyzes only a subset of the balance sheet risk 
handled by a bank. 
Economic importance versus statistical significance: in essence the capital 
adequacy test via PCA simply assesses the role of debt in the joint evolution of 
assets and liabilities. If debt (whose variations are measured via daily changes 
of the CDS levels) is significant in the regression (8), then the bank under 
scrutiny may be deemed weak in its amount of equity. Yet statistical significance 
does not imply necessarily economic importance: if, for example the amount of 
the linear estimate β were very low, although significant with a very low 
probability of type 1 Error, then the conclusion of the bank being 
undercapitalized should be mitigated. 
For this reason, when performing the capital adequacy test, we will also assess 
the explanatory power of PCRs onto the 2 components of the liabilities: equity 
and debt. The results will produce a number of qualitative and quantitative 
assessments on the capital structure of the banks in the sample. We will provide 
the rationale below; data and regression results will be presented in next 
chapter. 
 
Debt Regression and Equity Regression: Assessment on Capital 
Structure without Test of Hypothesis 
By Debt regression we mean the linear regression as per equation below:  
19 
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where, after running a PCA on the Market Variables, we gauge the explanatory 
power of PCR (daily variations) on the daily variations of the CDS (y) of the 
Bank. By Equity regression we adopt the same linear model (9) where y 
represents the daily variation of the stock value of the bank. We emphasize the 
economic meaning of these regressions: whereas above we presented a test for 
capital adequacy, therefore controlling for the type I error, here we are instead 
assuming that the bank is well capitalized when regressing equity onto PCRs. We 
are also assuming that it is not well capitalized when regressing Debt onto PCRs. 
Evaluating the fit of these regressions suggests a further approach to evaluate 
which assumption on the capital structure may be deemed more likely. If from a 
statistical viewpoint a formal test (as outlined above) is to be preferred, from an 
economic standpoint such capital adequacy test may be coupled with the results 
of these regressions, which can produce various outcomes: the most relevant for 
the purpose of this work are: 
a) PCR have explanatory power on neither equity nor debt: hence the 
approximation of risk via PCR does not properly address the volatility of 
assets and therefore PCR cannot explain the volatility of liabilities. The 
assumption of the assets as composed by Market Variables and 
Idiosyncratic Variables is disputable and PCA risk management may prove 
inadequate in managing risk. 
b) PCR have a satisfactory explanatory power on equity, but not satisfactory 
on debt: this is a signal of a healthy capital structure, since the equity is 
more reactive than debt and most of the volatility of assets is absorbed by 
equity. Therefore such scenario provides poor evidence that the amount of 
equity is not adequate. Also PCR obtained via liquid market variables may 
be considered of good explanatory power for the evolution of assets and 
adequate for the purpose of running risk management. 
c) PCR have a satisfactory explanatory power on debt, but not so satisfactory 
on equity. If this is the case, then debt is absorbing most of the volatility 
of the assets and therefore this hints to a bank operating under an 
inadequate capital structure since the role of equity is being played by 
debt.  
We might consider meaningful to analyze the magnitude of the positive 
difference between Debt regression R Squared and Equity regression R Squared.  
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Point (a) above means that PCA Risk Management did not guess the right 
Principal components of risk, which were derived from the most liquid variables 
representing Rates risk, Government risk, and Credit Risk. The scenario under 
(a) is a simple assessment that such a guess may be misleading, since PCR have 
nothing to explain on balance sheet variance. If instead we are under the 
scenarios described according to point (b) and/or (c), then PCA risk 
management has an adequate descriptive power on the risk handled by the 
bank. In this sense PCA driven risk management may be considered a new tool 
of risk management since it decomposes risk into independent factors, which can 
be handled separately. 
If PCR provide a satisfactory explanatory power on debt (and/or equity) 
management cannot ignore if the capital structure is best described under point 
(b) or (c). A comparison across R Squared (Debt versus equity) is the judgment 
of Markets on the soundness of capital of the bank, in spite of any regulatory 
opinion or assessment. 
PCA Risk management allows the computation of R Squared coefficients which 
may lead to further conclusion on the current status and evolution of capital 
structure. Provided at least one of them is large enough, then we find useful to 
analyze their joint evolution through time. We may thus analyze an evolution in 
continuous time of balance sheet ratios versus a regulatory world where ratios 
are released only on a discrete time schedule and they are dependent on 
accounting rules/choices.  Given the relevance of the R squared coefficients in 
this work we will refer to 
 Adjusted R squared obtained by regressing the daily differences of the 
CDS onto the daily differences of PCR: such coefficient will be denoted as 
        
 Adjusted R squared obtained by regressing the daily differences of the 
stock value of the bank onto the daily differences of PCR: such coefficient 
will be denoted as         
We will define “Inverted Capital Structure” the event  
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Regardless from the regulatory compliance of solvency ratios, Inversion of 
capital structure has a warning power for management:  debt is better explained 
than equity by market variables. This may signal that Equity may no longer be 
capable to absorb the (market variables) risk handled by the bank.         and 
        represent the PCA Risk Management statistics for capital structure (“PCR 
Statistics” in the remainder of this work).  
We will compute the PCR Statistics for the banks contained in the 12th series of 
the Itraxx Index “Financial Senior” in next chapter. 
 
Limits of the PCR Capital Adequacy Test and Importance of the PCR 
Statistics 
PCR Capital Adequacy Test presented above aims at exploring the role of debt, 
as one of the regressors, in explaining the evolution of Equity. In this section we 
emphasize the main limit of such test. A judgment on the capital structure of a 
bank is a complex task: it is also currently debated via a hectic evolution of 
regulatory guidelines on capital requirements and Stress tests. As such no 
simple econometric test may have the power to assess the right amount of 
capital for a bank. The market metric proposed in the second part of this thesis 
certainly skips a number of relevant variables, but provides some measures on 
the status of the capital structure as perceived by the market, away from a 
regulatory filter. The PCR Capital Adequacy Test is based on such market metric, 
yet may prove inadequate in the event of a strongly undercapitalized bank. 
In particular, a bank heavily undercapitalized can be represented via an equity 
behavior comparable to a very out of the money call option: the value of assets 
is so lower than the value of liabilities that any variation (in the value) of assets 
translates into a variation of (the value of) debt. In a state of a significant 
undercapitalization, the value of equity is a close to zero delta call on the value 
of assets: therefore it no longer reacts in response to an evolution of the assets. 
If this is the scenario, then we should expect that the PCR Capital Adequacy Test 
cannot detect the role of debt in the evolution of capital structure: indeed, 
recalling the regression (8), debt simply would have no explanatory power on 
equity. This would result into a low beta and possibly a poor significance of the 
variation of debt. In this case the conclusion that the bank is not 
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undercapitalized, at least with respect to a market risk metric, would be 
inaccurate  
                     
Hence when the quality of the regression (8) is poor, then the analysis of the 
PCR statistics should prevail on the PCR Capital Adequacy test, as a tool to judge 
the capital structure of the bank under scrutiny. There is no simple formula that 
maps an undercapitalized bank to certain values of the PCR statistics; the latter 
provide, especially if analyzed through time, a hint on the evolution of the 
capital structure and give an intuition on the sensitivity of debt to the risk 
represented by market variables.  
  
Why a Market Metric for Capital Structure? 
The reader may argue that assessment of capital structure should not be 
confused with Market perception of capital structure, the latter assessed by the 
joint evolution of debt and equity, as quoted by financial markets. If the market 
is wrong in quoting debt and equity, then the assessment on capital structure 
will be misleading. While agreeing in principle with this objection, the self-
fulfilling aspect of the market perception is quite a binding constraint for the 
banking sector. If, for the sake of example, the market expresses a market 
value of debt and equity lower than the fundamental one, the bank may have no 
other route for rolling its debt and capital issuance than the market itself. Hence, 
while rolling debt at market levels, far from fundamentals, market evaluation 
prevails and is imposed on the bank with no other refinancing tools other than 
the financial market.  Similar reasoning holds for a capital increase: if a bank is 
forced to recapitalize due to the compulsory requirement to be compliant with 
regulatory guidelines, then the market valuation will prevail, thus imposing a 
significant discount on tangible equity. 2008-2012 have been years where the 
banking sector had to tap the refinancing facilities offered by central banks in 
order to escape the punitive yields required by the financial market to roll debt. 
Such intervention of central banks has been at the center of many debates 
questioning the role of the central banks and ultimately resulting into a 
significant increase of the assets held by central banks. We regard the bold 
intervention of central banks as an exogenous variable when conceiving risk 
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management for a bank: the latter should be centered on the actual cost for 
debt and equity. This is the reason why the analysis on capital structure and the 
tests proposed have been derived from market variables.  
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APPENDIX 
Practical implications: when regulatory framework diverges from PCA 
Risk Management 
PCA risk management may lead to conclusions quite divergent from the 
regulatory/accounting model of risk management. Yet the latter is imposed by 
regulators, hence it is widely used in the banking sector, at least at the stage of 
computing capital and solvency requirements to be published within Financials. 
The financial crisis has made evident that the accounting definition of capital 
may diverge from economic capital. Similarly risk, from a regulatory viewpoint, 
may turn out to be a substantially different from what perceived by the market: 
PCA risk management is one of the many attempts to build a frame to address a 
notion of “economic” risk, to be read as an alternative viewpoint from 
“regulatory risk” 
In this section we will make one example, relating to interest rates risk. Interest 
rates risk is the risk that a change in interest rates may cause a change in the 
value of an asset (or a liability). Interest rates risk is quite closely monitored by 
regulators who impose, among various requirements, that a change41 in interest 
rates of 2% should not erode more than 20% of the regulatory capital. 
Interest rates risk was so central until few years ago that Banks ALM department 
were considering it as one of the main variables to jointly manage assets and 
liabilities. The argument is that interest rates risk management would decrease 
the potential change in the value of assets and liabilities. Hence, ultimately, 
reducing this risk would mean a smaller variability on the capital of the bank. 
Balance sheet items typically hedged against interest rates movements are 
mainly loans where the borrower pays fixed rate or debt where the bank pays 
fixed rate. The overall idea is to hedge the net exposure (after a “natural hedge” 
effect between assets and liabilities) to interest rates. This reasoning was 
leading ALM departments to identify a net interest rates exposure by maturity 
                                                             
41 Meant as absolute variation. 
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(sometimes called “buckets”). Such interest rates exposure is most of the times 
hedged via an accounting scheme42 called “Fair Value Hedge Accounting”. 
Fair Value Hedge accounting is a hedging technique whereby an asset (Hedged 
Item) is hedged against, for example, a rise in interest rates (Designated Risk), 
by a derivative contract (Hedging Instrument)43. Hence, if, for example, we 
consider a fixed rate Government Bond in the scenario of an interest rates rise, 
the Bond will lose value and such value loss will be associated in accounting 
terms to a derivative contract gaining value in the same scenario. This is the 
logic behind Fair Value Hedge accounting; a similar reasoning (although on the 
liability side) may be made in terms of ordinary bond paying fixed rate coupon. 
The key question is: will assets and liabilities paying fixed rate be actually worth 
more due to a drop in interest rates?  
Adopting Fair Value Hedge Accounting (below FVHA) means an affirmative reply 
to last question. We may ask the same question to PCA and then deduce if, in 
the metric of PCA risk management, FVHA is an efficient tool in preserving the 
value of assets and liabilities. More generally, we may ask the question by 
analyzing the same portfolio of 9 variables presented at the beginning of this 
work: we will then determine if, in the context of an entire portfolio, hedging the 
interest rate component adds stability to the portfolio or produces an increase in 
variance. 
More specifically, we will determine if an increase in interest rates does actually 
primarily imply a reduction of value in Government bonds.  
We have emphasized above that interest rates loading factor in the definition of 
the first principal component of risk (PCR) is negligible with respect to the 
loading factor of the government bonds. We deduce that the variance of the 
assets is not explained by interest rates if not by a small percentage; when 
narrowing the attention to government bonds, their role in defining the first PCR 
(measured by the magnitude of the loading factor) is so much more relevant 
than the interest rates risk that hedging the interest rate component of bonds 
                                                             
42 This section does not mean to list all accounting schemes implemented to manage risk. It simply 
provides examples of the drastic change in approach PCA risk management may mean. 
43 The author acknowledges that such a definition is reductive, yet it suffices for the purpose of this 
work.  
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cannot be expected to reduce significantly the overall variance of the portfolio. 
However the conclusion may significantly change if we consider German 
government bonds rather than Italian/ Spanish government bonds. The 
conclusion also depends on the length of the sample we are considering. In the 
table below we only analyze one subset of the PCA results, relating to the 
weights of only 5 variables (weights for the definition of the first PCR). We are 
thus narrowing the focus on the interest rates risk and government risk. Fair 
Value Hedge Accounting would argue that such weights should have the same 
sign and a similar magnitude (so that a rise in interest rates would imply a gain 
on the derivative contract and a similar loss for having purchased a bond at 
lower level of yields). If the signs were not the same, then we would be at odds 
with the implicit assumption of fair value hedge accounting. If, in the assumption 
of dealing with the same sign, the magnitude of the weights were materially 
different, than we would not face a symmetry between gain and loss, which is 
the requirement of any efficient hedging technique.  
TABLE 4: EVOLUTION OF INTEREST RATE RISK AND GOVERNMENT RISK IN DEFINING 
PCR(1): COMPARISON ACROSS SAMPLES 
 
Numbers across different samples show the same sign of German government 
bonds and the magnitude is quite similar too (comparison between Security 1 
and Security 3). That would entail then that FVHA is an accounting treatment of 
a hedging technique which proves consistent with the conclusion of PCA risk 
management. Such a conclusion instead changes when we apply the same 
hedging technique to Spanish and/or Italian government bonds. Not only most 
of the samples show different signs, but even in the only sample when the sign 
is the same, the weight of the Italian/Spanish government yields is by far 
higher. PCA risk management would encourage not to apply Fair Value Hedge 
Accounting to government bonds unless issued by Germany.  
PCA risk management would even imply the opposite: not only a loss of value on 
the government bonds due to a rise in yields cannot be compensated by a 
derivative contract gaining when interest rates increase; but hedging the value 
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of a government bonds portfolio would imply to enter positions gaining when 
interest rates drop (rather than rise).  This would prove variance reductive in all 
samples other than the shortest one, of 247 data points).  
Risk management and regulatory framework were originally conceived during 
periods that had not confronted the current level of turbulence. More 
importantly, they never confronted a systemic fragility. They were built in times 
when risk could be decomposed into simple variables and the latter managed 
individually. Differentiation theories were sound since correlation across different 
asset classes was stable enough. Such stability in correlation was even exploited 
by financial markets in the wake of structured products: CDO (collateralized debt 
obligations) were products offering leveraged exposure to defaults of multiple 
entities and priced with reliance on stable correlation (implied by the correlation 
market and by the actual stability of realized correlation).  
In its own way the bank deals with a leverage exposure to plenty of variables 
too: a risk management cannot ignore the correlation across all of them. The 
bank also needs a focus on fewer variables to understand where the core risk is 
and how it affects the perception of the riskiness of the bank on the market (i.e. 
the CDS level). 
Some readers may object to the mentioned divergence between PCA approach 
and Fair Value Hedge accounting, by emphasizing that the reason why a drop in 
interest rates is simultaneous with a drop in the value of some government 
bonds is due to the credit deterioration priced by the market against sovereign 
risk. Hence the interest rate risk is properly addressed by the risk manager 
applying FVHA; Credit risk is not addressed since the purpose of the investment 
is to monetize the credit risk priced by the market for government bonds. This 
kind of objection finds its rationale in the logic division between credit risk and 
interest rates risk. Principal component analysis hints that a risk management 
does not have to take as given the number of risks to analyze. PCA driven risk 
management asks history what relevant variables of risk are to be considered. 
Credit and rates move together, hence addressing them separately may lead to 
amplifying risks rather than managing the balance sheet variance. 
Furthermore risk is not necessarily to be avoided, otherwise we could not expect 
profitability either. Uncorrelated (or poorly correlated) risk contributing only 
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marginally to the balance sheet variance may provide, ceteris paribus, a high 
return on economic capital (even if such conclusion may not apply in regulatory 
terms). 
Increasing interest rates have the property to be negatively correlated with 
credit deterioration during the financial crisis: a reduction on interest rates was 
simultaneous with an increase in yields of many securities. Hence to hedge the 
interest rate risk component of such securities may have reduced the volatility 
(ex ante) in terms of regulatory capital, but it did not have the same result in 
terms of Balance sheet variance (hence volatility of economic Capital).
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Results of the PCA - Sensitivity of PCA Risk management to 
sample history  
We run a PCA on the 9 liquid variables (representative of liquid market risk) 
presented in the work for 1 year of sample history, and obtain the following 
decomposition of variance across 3 principal components, or PCR: 
 
 
TABLE 5: WEIGHTS FOR EACH VARIABLE WHEN DEFINING PCR(1) AND PCR(2) 
 
Following in a histogram format are the loadings of each variable in defining 
PCR(1) and PCR(2). 
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Figure 5: Loadings of the first 2 principal components obtained via a PCA run on 
247 days 
If the representation of the asset, for the purpose of analyzing risk, could be 
deemed correct (this issue will be addressed in the remainder of this work), then 
PCA Risk management would allow the following considerations: 
The improvement of the credit conditions of government bonds (lower yields) is 
simultaneous with the improvement in quality of subinvestment grade entities. 
The first Principal component of risk (representing over 70% of the variation of 
the portfolio) also signals that the main variables in the sample are the index 
Crossover, the yield of Italian Government bonds and the Index Financial Sub.  
A remaining 23% of the variance is explained by Spanish government bonds 
moving in the opposite direction with respect to Crossover. This latest analysis 
emphasizes the importance of government bonds as a variable: not only they 
are relevant when analyzing the first PCR (typically the first PCR represents the 
bulk of systemic risk in the economy), but a further 23% of the variance is 
mainly driven by their movements. 
Government bonds and Crossover have the highest absolute loading factor in 
defining PCR1 (the one summarizing most of the sample variance); interest 
rates have the lowest absolute weights.  
Also, hedging does not have to observe rigidly the definition of the  Principal 
components of risk: it is evident for example that if the risk manager buys 
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protection on the index Crossover, he will have a benefit also in the scenario of a 
deterioration of a government position (in 63% of the cases). Also, interest rates 
movements do not seem to have a particular role in explaining risk during the 
analyzed year. 
How would the analysis change if, rather than 1 year the risk manager chose 2 
years of history? We will define PCA Risk Management as “Adaptive” since it 
captures correlations as they realize within the data sample; clearly with a 
different time series the definition of risk factors may be different. Hence, as 
time evolves, PCA ran to the latest window of data will adapt to new correlations 
shown by the market. 
This question is addressed by investigating on the change in the PCR definition 
upon different choices of sample history. We will therefore consider a sample 
with (a) 247 days, (b) 492 days and (c) 619 days.  We would find it desirable if 
PCA risk management could exhibit a robustness property: hence we determine 
the variability of ranking of the absolute value of the weights when defining the 
Principal Components of Risk. The first 2 principal components of risk summarize 
more than 85% of the sample variance, hence we will not analyze the ranking 
variability on the third principal component of risk.  
Table 6: Ranking score for each variable in defining PCR(1). 1 is associated to 
the variable with highest loading; 9 is associated to the variable with lowest 
loading. 
 
TABLE 7: WEIGHT OF EACH VARIABLE WHEN DEFINING PCR(1) 
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Absolute lack of variability in ranking represents the maximum degree of 
robustness: this is equivalent to the statement that the relative importance of 
the variables in defining the PCRs does not change when we select a different 
sample history. Such a level of robustness would be too high, since risk 
management would not have a tool capable to learn new correlations and new 
relevance of the variables upon analysis of a different sample length. 
On the other hand, too much variability would imply that risk management is too 
sample dependent, hence risk management would be redefining PCRs too often 
with the consequent need to readjust hedging strategies. 
Also ranking variance is to be analyzed with particular attention for the variables 
with the highest loading, since a substantial change in the weight of such 
variables would imply a substantial change of the PCR. A low ranking variable 
with high ranking volatility would not imply a major change for risk 
management.  
The most ranking-volatile variable (across different samples) is the yield of the 
German bonds which, from lowest ranking (9th) on a 247 days sample, gains 
more importance when the sample length is extended to 492 and 619 days 
(scoring respectively 5th and 6th). Apart from German yields, the ranking 
variance is contained for the most relevant variables (the ones with highest 
ranking).  
We also analyze, with respect to ranking volatility, the second component of risk 
PCR(2), in the appendix. 
The second aspect to analyze across various samples is the sign of the loadings 
of the variables (relative to each other): if two variables have the same sign, 
then PCA risk management is noticing that they increase or decrease together. 
Hence when analyzing the sign of the variables, relative to each other, we refer 
to the sign of the variable with highest absolute weight and compare it with the 
sign of all the variables ranking immediately after (in terms of weight 
magnitude). In analogy with what stated in terms of ranking variance, a 
different sample may show changing correlations: PCR may see some variables 
change sign with respect to the one ranking first (i.e. in one sample one variable 
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may have the same sign as the one with the highest absolute weight and in a 
different sample they instead may have weights with opposite sign). 
Given the importance of correlation when dealing with risk management, it is 
relevant that at least the highest ranking variables may have the same sign 
across samples (relative to each other). If that were not the case then 
correlation caught by PCA Risk management would be too unstable and suggest 
a decomposition of risk into PCR(s) which would prove too data dependent.  
In order to evaluate this point on the available samples we rank the variables 
according to their weight’s absolute magnitude: we notice that the highest 4 
ranking variables preserve their (relative) sign. The same analysis across 
samples also holds for the second component of risk: the first 5 highest ranking 
variables preserve their sign across samples (relative to each other). More 
analysis will be presented in the appendix. 
In this work we are applying a very basic implementation of PCA: a field of 
literature explores how to make PCA and Functional PCA more robust to data 
and time variation. Ideally PCR should be temporally and market consistent to 
produce a consistent risk management. While the purpose of this work is to 
propose a new idea of risk management, the author acknowledges that the 
statistical tools here adopted are by choice the simplest: further literature 
develops the theme of how PCA can be best adapted to the features of financial 
time series. Ramsay & Silverman and Hamilton are excellent for an introduction 
to Functional PCA. Also, Jaimungal & Eddie K.H.Ng (2007) propose to remove 
the temporal structure embedded in the time series so that the principal 
components can be extracted in a self consistent manner. Among the practical 
implications, the authors show that a sample perturbation produces a higher 
difference on the standard principal components as opposed to the principal 
components obtained via the method they propose. 
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TABLE 8: DEFINITION OF THE FIRST PRICINIPAL COMPONENT OF RISK (WEIGHTS 
ASSIGNED BY PCA TO EACH VARIABLE) 
 
TABLE 9: DEFINITION OF THE SECOND PRICINIPAL COMPONENT OF RISK (WEIGHTS 
ASSIGNED BY PCA TO EACH VARIABLE) 
 
TABLE 10: RANKING OF THE VARIABLES IN DEFINING PCR(1), BY ABSOLUTE MAGNITUDE 
OF THE WEIGHT ASSIGNED BY PCA 
 
TABLE 11: RANKING OF THE VARIABLES IN DEFINING PCR(2), BY ABSOLUTE MAGNITUDE 
OF THE WEIGHT ASSIGNED BY PCA 
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Composition of Itraxx indices (series 12): index Itraxx Europe 
and Financial Senior 
The index Itraxx Europe, also known simply as 'The Main', is composed of the 
most liquid 125 CDS referencing European investment grade credits, subject to 
certain sector rules as determined by the IIC and also as determined by the 
SEC. More specifically, the iTraxx® Europe index comprises 125 investment 
grade rated European entities selected from the Liquidity List. All entities must 
satisfy the membership determination criteria. Among such criteria it is disposed 
that the final index comprises 125 entities and is constructed by selecting the 
highest ranking entities in each sector on the Liquidity List, subject to the 
following sector restrictions:  
a. 30 Autos & Industrials  
b. 30 Consumers  
c. 20 Energy  
d. 20 TMT  
e. 25 Financials (separate Senior & Subordinated indices) 
The levels of the index Financial Senior (more properly iTraxx Europe Senior 
Financials), with tenor 5y maturity, intuitively includes all financial senior CDS of 
financial reference entities. More specifically, this index is the weighted average 
of the 25 names belonging to the financial sector and included in the index 
Itraxx Europe (as per description above, point e). 
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TABLE 12: COMPOSITION OF THE ITRAXX FINANCIAL SENIOR INDEX (SERIES 12). THE 
GREY FIELD EMPHASIZES THE NAMES ANALYZED IN THE ECONOMETRIC SECTION IN 
THIS WORK 
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TABLE 13: COMPOSITION OF THE INDEX ITRAXX MAIN (SERIES 12). 
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CHAPTER 3:  
PCR STATISTICS AND CAPITAL 
ADEQUACY TEST:  A  NEW METRIC FOR 
SYSTEMIC RISK?  
 
Systemic Risk: Introduction and Motivation 
Systemic risk is a key concept to interpret current financial and economic crisis, 
yet there is no consensus on its definition and measurement. It is associated 
with lack of confidence on the self adjustment of the financial markets without a 
disruptive outcome. 
Ultimately systemic risk is questioning that the system may not survive: when 
facing the possibility that the system may collapse the reactions of economic 
agents are unpredictable and so is the transmission mechanism of economic 
policy. This unpredictability of transmission effects has made the expression 
“Unchartered territories” quite adopted even by policy makers. 
These intuitions do not lead to a definition of systemic risk but provide an 
explanation on why systemic risk is mainly a macro-economic concept: the 
novelty of this chapter is in providing a micro approach to systemic risk.  
Insolvency of the financial system and extraordinary variance of financial 
variables are, in light of the intuitions above, the very first factors to monitor in 
the aim of proposing a measure of systemic risk. For this reason we are 
decomposing the variability of the main financial liquid variables into principal 
components, in order to dispose of orthogonal factors of risk, to be addressed 
independently. We can read the variability of the assets of a bank as a sum of 
idiosyncratic risk and market risk. PCR will propose a summary of the variance 
deriving from market risk if PCR are derived as a PCA on market variables. How 
do we move from this definition of risk to the concept of systemic risk? 
The author believes that systemic risk requires a transmission mechanism that 
makes such risk shared by the entire system. The contributions of many authors 
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on the theme focus on the idea that systemic risk is the propensity of a financial 
institution to be undercapitalized when the financial system as a whole is 
undercapitalized: this reading of the systemic risk has generated a plethora of 
successful estimators of systemic risk but does not help in addressing the 
propagation of systemic risk. Risk managers and regulators need to address 
systemic risk before facing the consequences of a firm being undercapitalized 
when the entire system is undercapitalized. More importantly, if a bank is 
strongly exposed to a certain risk, for the sake of examples, a rise in interest 
rates, is that risk systemic? 
 
The Propagation of Systemic Risk 
The framework presented in the previous chapter proposes a reading of risk 
obtained via liquid variables, via decomposition of market risk of a bank into 
PCRs: is such risk compatible with the size of equity? If the size of the available 
capital is too small, then the variation of the assets cannot be fully absorbed by 
the variations in value of equity. Therefore other layers of the capital structure 
must adapt in value due to the scarcity of capital. Hence, the intuition that 
inspires the next econometric section and this entire work is that once equity is 
insufficient, then debt has to adapt to the variations of the value of assets. 
Financial debt is a typology of instrument that not only serves the purpose of 
securing term liquidity for the issuing bank, but also contributes to the growth 
(or stability) of the leverage in the economy where banks operate. This 
statement is justified by acknowledging that financial senior debt is commonly 
accepted as eligible collateral, among the many facilities, for refinancing with the 
central bank (provided that the rating of the issuing bank is investment grade). 
As a result, when debt adapts its value to the variations of the assets of a bank 
then it becomes a transmission tool of the variance that can no longer be 
absorbed by the equity. 
This introduction justifies why the author proposes a reading that a market risk 
(represented via PCR) is systemic (in a certain percentage) in the extent that 
Equity is no longer capable to provide a buffer against it. We would be facing 
then the event that Debt is explanatory of a high percentage of the variability of 
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the Market risk, which triggers a questioning of solvency, since debt is affected 
by the strong fluctuations of the assets value. 
This introduction serves the purpose of presenting PCR Statistics as a measure 
of adequacy of capital structure to the risk as perceived by markets (away from 
a regulatory meter). When solvency is questioned (Equity may prove inadequate 
as a buffer for the variance experienced by assets) and PCR have a strong 
explanatory power towards debt, then we deem that the risk experienced by the 
single financial institution is potentially highly systemic and that debt is acting as 
a transmission mechanism of the systemic risk. The risk represented by a 
Principal Component of risk is systemic if a large number of the financial 
institutions share the same dependence. This reading would also provide an 
explanation why one of the distinguishing feature of the current financial crisis is 
the amount of liabilities guaranteed by a sovereign state: this work would 
encourage seeing such guarantees as an attempt to break the transmission 
mechanism of the systemic risk. This reading also emphasizes the separation 
between market variables and intrinsic variables: by definition, systemic risk can 
be explained by the variables shared by the banking sector and not by the ones 
specific (intrinsic) to a single financial institution. Principal components of risk, in 
their role of summarizing market variables only, not only represent the starting 
point in investigating systemic risk, but also propose the building blocks 
(independent from each other, in statistical terms) to manage in case the risk 
represented by market is to be controlled. 
We will then define the systemic risk, for the single financial institution, as the 
explanatory power that PCR have on Debt. In this work we avail ourselves of a 
simple statistical tool of linear regression and therefore the explanatory power of 
PCR on debt can be summarized via (adjusted) R squared. Future research may 
explore the link between market risk in the assets of a bank and its debt via 
more refined tools and therefore propose different measures. Yet this work 
emphasizes the role of debt as transmission mechanism of market risk, due to a 
size of available equity not adequate for the realized volatility of assets. The 
intuition behind the choice of debt as transmission mechanism is that a volatile 
debt makes the refinancing transactions in the economy as volatile, being debt 
the most accepted collateral for refinancing operations via the repo market and 
central banks. In light of this intuition, the actual transmission of systemic risk 
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takes place via debt admitted as elegible collateral by central banks and by the 
netting mechanisms existing in financial markets. Hence the choice, in the 
econometric section of this work of Itraxx Financial Senior as the index 
representing the exposure towards financial debt held by a bank: such index is 
composed by the CDS of issuers whose rating is in the investment grade 
category; therefore their debt is widely accepted as collateral. 
Such an analysis of capital structure leads then to the search of new capital 
structure instruments that may decrease the sensitivity of Senior debt to market 
risk: that would prove the primary tool for reduction of systemic risk. 
From a macroeconomic viewpoint, if debt is a transmission mechanism for 
systemic risk we should expect that the adjusted R squared for the Debt 
regression is high for a sample of banks simultaneously. This intuition derives 
from the definition of “systemic risk”, i.e. affecting a system and not limited to 
few institutions only. We will assess this statement from an econometric 
viewpoint in the section below. 
We acknowledge that such definition of Systemic risk, centered on the idea of 
debt as transmission mechanism is dissimilar from a measure aimed at capturing 
the degree of undercapitalization of a financial institution when the entire system 
is undercapitalized. Whereas the latter is the idea emphasized by many authors, 
including Engle, Jondeau and Rockinger (2012), this work instead is 
investigating the event that equity is inadequate for the purpose of absorbing 
the fluctuations of the assets. This is investigated independently from the 
behavior of the entire financial system and we derive a measure of 
undercapitalization when fluctuations in equity are no longer explained by the 
fluctuations of assets. 
This reading of the event of undercapitalization is also dissimilar from the 
“regulatory event” that the tier 1 ratio falls below a certain ratio. In the frame 
proposed in this work an undercapitalization is signaled by a low R squared in 
the Equity regression (or, more generally, by a weak link between risk of the 
assets and equity of the same institution). This work relies on a reading of the 
risk via Principal components of Risk, and adopts the simplest econometric 
model to explore the relationship between assets and liabilities. Future research 
may explore how to best summarize the behavior of assets and therefore derive 
101 | A  j o u r n e y  t h r o u g h  t h e  c a p i t a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  b a n k i n g  s e c t o r  
 
a different notion of risk management. Exploring the link between assets 
fluctuations and equity will then have different regressors, yet the measure of 
undercapitalization will ultimately be translated as a poor explanatory power of 
the regressors onto the fluctuations of equity. 
Such a frame also allows investigating the event of undercapitalization via a 
market metric rather than a regulatory metric. Such event of undercapitalization 
may or may not be experienced in an undercapitalized financial system. Yet 
identifying a transmission mechanism via debt addresses how to reduce 
systemic risk via tools other than capital increases. 
The author believes in a role of the subordinated debt (as presented at the end 
of this work) as a valid remedy especially when a capital issuance is too 
detrimental for current shareholders (or unfeasible). Risk management via 
Principal component of risks and subordinated debt represent a cheaper and less 
drastic way to reduce balance sheet volatility. 
Debt as transmission mechanism for systemic risk also proves a valid intuition to 
explain the so called “Endogenous Risk”, i.e. the amplification of market volatility 
due to the reaction of the system to an exogenous shock. Danielsson, Shin and 
Zigrand produce a powerful analogy to recall the meaning of Endogenous Risk: 
“a small gust of wind produce a small sway in the Millennium bridge. Pedestrians 
crossing the bridge would then adjust their stance slightly as a response, 
pushing the bridge further in the same direction. Provided sufficiently many 
pedestrians found themselves in the same situation, they will find themselves 
coordinating spontaneously and unwittingly to move in lockstep, thereby 
reinforcing the swaying into a something much more violent. Even if the initial 
gust of wind is long gone, the bridge continues to wobble. Similarly, financial 
crises appear to gather more energy as they develop. And even if the initial 
shock is gone, volatility stays high”.  
Similarly, when financial senior debt and/or government debt loses value, then it 
is immediate to identify a number of transactions requesting further margin calls 
and, more generally, the entire refinancing system in the economy disposing of 
less collateral. It goes beyond the scope of this paper to analyze in detail such 
transmission mechanism, yet this introduction to systemic risk provides a hint to 
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why volatility of debt is so relevant. Debt44 is financed via repo markets or via 
refinancing facilities made available by Central Banks: hence a volatile debt 
implies volatile refinancing conditions. 
This measure of systemic risk provides a change in perspective from the 
systemic risk analytics derived so far in the literature, which we will very briefly 
recall below. 
 
Literature on Systemic Risk 
Bisias, Flood, Lo and Valavanis offer an excellent survey of systemic risk 
analytics: in this paragraph we will recall what they categorize the “Forward-
Looking Risk Measurement” and the “Cross Sectional measures”. Recalling the 
principal aspects of these measures will help in emphasizing both the limits and 
the novelties presented in this work. 
Gray and Jobst apply Merton’s model where equity is analyzed as a call option 
on the assets of the firm. The comparison across equity prices and CDS levels is 
the base to derive the proportion of the expected loss born by the private sector 
as a systemic impact. Such approach relies on an assumption of distribution of 
the assets and does not hint to the intervention in the micromanagement of the 
firm in order to deal with systemic risk. 
Segoviano and Goodhart model systemic risk via a banking system multivariate 
distribution function: they employ a maximum entropy estimation, to be 
consistent with observed probabilities of distress, derived via a variety of 
approaches, including equity options and CDS levels. This approach allows the 
authors to obtain a banking stability index, reflecting the number of banks 
becoming distressed given that at least one bank has become distressed. This 
measure of systemic risk has the advantage of not introducing a large number of 
assumptions on the assets of a bank. As a result the systemic risk measure 
obtained may be of particular use to a regulator to monitor the evolution of the 
financial system; It would not add powerful insights on the transmission 
mechanism of the systemic risk, nor its management at a micro level. 
                                                             
44 Purchased by a third party 
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Principal Component Analysis is at the heart of the definition of the Absorption 
Ratio, in Kritzman, Li, Page and Rigobon. Their measure of systemic risk aims at 
capturing the extent to which markets are unified or tightly coupled. The crucial 
difference with respect to this work is that they apply PCA to the daily returns 
for the 51 industries of the MSCI US Index. 
In the field of Cross sectional measures we will instead mention some of the 
measures developed by the literature aiming at examining the co-dependence of 
institutions on each other’s health. Before we list some of the major 
contributions in literature on this particular theme, how does PCR Risk 
Management provide such cross sectional reading of the health of the financial 
system? The answer, once more is in the reading of the PCR Statistics. Do the 
financial institutions in the sample share all the same dependence (in terms of 
sign and magnitude), towards PCRs? Is that true for equity and debt? 
More will be discussed in the econometric section below: in the scenario of 
Equityzation of Debt, should different banks have a high linear coefficient (with 
same sign) towards the first principal component of risk, then that PCR would 
represent the composition of Systemic Risk and the co-dependence across 
financial institutions is quite high due to the significant and simultaneous 
sensitivity of debt to the same PCR. 
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010) develop the CoVAR measure which, in its 
simplest format, investigates the VAR of one institution for a specific probability, 
conditional on the Var of another institution being at its VAR threshold for the 
same quantile. CoVAR adopts quantile regression to capture the empirical 
relationship between VaRs in the tails of the joint distribution. In order to 
capture time variation in the joint distribution between two firms (or between 
one financial institution and the entire system), the authors introduce an 
assumption on the evolution of the value of assets, by selecting as input the 
equity market capitalization of financial institutions and assuming a constant 
leverage across dates of publication of financials. Also the authors capture time 
variation in the joint distribution between a singular financial institution and the 
system by introducing a conditional distribution estimated as a function of state 
variables.  
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Co-Risk measure of International Monetary Fund shares a similar structure with 
CoVar, with the exception that CDS levels are analyzed, conditional on the 95th 
percentile of the other firm’s CDS level (in terms of empirical distribution). In 
particular, the level of one firm is regressed onto the cds level of another and a 
vector of risk factors. Also in this model a quantile regression plays a crucial 
role. The approach relies on no assumptions relating to the assets of the firm 
and defines the CoRisk as the ratio between the quantile regression- estimated 
CDS level (of a certain firm) and its actual percentile CDS level from the 
empirical distribution. 
PCR Statistics represent a very different approach from CoVar and CoRISK: PCR 
statistics consider jointly both CDS and Equity levels and investigate the 
adequacy of capital structure to systemic risk for each institution. PCR Statistics 
rely on a smaller set of assumptions; yet they do not propose how to meausure 
the simultaneity of the distress across two institutions. The main difference is in 
the philosophy and the questions at the heart of the PCR Statistics as opposed to 
any Cross Sectional measure of systemic risk, including CoVAR and CoRisk. 
Cross sectional measures aim at measuring a distress occurring in few 
datapoints of the sample (by construction the co-movement in rare scenarios 
over the 95th quantile). PCR statistics are conceived in a framework where the 
author is dubious about predicting the behavior of the system when the latter is 
affected by extreme realizations of systemic risk. Hence PCR Statistics provide 
an idea of the sensitivity of the capital structure to systemic risk, be it when it is 
still benign and also when degenerating to its disastrous realizations. The main 
logic is that, if few Principal Components of Risk have a good descriptive power 
on all capital structures of all banks in the sample, then such principal 
components are a common explanation for risk and the system no longer relies 
on a principle of diversification. Robert Engle defines systemic risk the 
propensity of a financial institution to be undercapitalized when the financial 
system as a whole is undercapitalized; this work defines systemic risk as the 
propensity that a financial institution’s risk be explained by few liquid variables 
when the same variables are also explanatory of the risk of the entire system. 
The difference in approach is quite dissimilar, since the question is very different 
at the very beginning: this work does not aim at providing a measure of 
systemic risk at a cross sectional level; it aims towards an effort of risk 
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management ready to take into account that a significant portion of risk may be 
systemic. Therefore managing risk requires acknowledgement of its systemic 
character along with the implications on capital structure and (potential) losses 
for the entire system. Cross sectional measures of systemic risk like CoVAR and 
CoRISK do not mean to explore the capital structure of single financial 
institutions. 
Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon and Richardson (2010) also rely on a measure of 
undercapitalization of one firm when the system as a whole is undercapitalized: 
such measure is the systemic expected shortfall and they propose three proxies 
(stress test based, equity based and CDS based). Systemic expected shortfall is 
regressed on the MES (Marginal expected Shortfall) and leverage. Both variables 
are also given a microeconomic theoretica foundation with SES. The marginal 
expected shortfall of a financial institution is the average return of the latter 
during the 5% worst days for the overall market return. Compared to the 
framework proposed in this work, one of the differences is in the input data, 
which also relies on balance sheet data, as the very first input to determine the 
standard approximation of leverage; also the model does not consider equity 
levels and CDS levels jointly. Each firm is measured for the predictable 
component of its systemic risk, as determined by SES; yet no capital structure 
related conclusion can be drawn. 
The last measure of systemic risk to be mentioned in this brief summary is the 
“Distressed Insurance Premium” (Huang, Zhou, and Zhu, 2009b) which is an 
estimate of the total losses that exceed a given threshold, for example 15% of 
total banks’ liabilities. This model requires a number of assumptions on asset 
correlation, which is proxied by equity correlation. An assumption of constant 
leverage is adopted and an estimation procedure for future correlation is based 
on a predictive regression where average correlations and a set of financial 
variables represent the regressors. Probabilities of default are inferred from CDS 
levels and the price for insurance against losses in the banking sector over next 
quarter can be calculated. Distress, in this case, stands for default of a certain 
percentage of the liabilities in the banking sector. Such a measure of systemic 
risk relies on introducing, for the N banks’ asset values, common and 
idiosyncratic components as in the ASRF (Vasicek, 1991) model of portfolio 
credit risk. Distressed insurance premium model offers a monetary measure of 
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distress and it differs from the approach in this work for the number of 
assumptions and for being based on a Montecarlo approach, in 2 important 
phases: computation of probabilities of joint defaults and distribution of LGD. 
 
Data and Computation of PCR Statistics 
The data is the set of daily levels for all liquid variables, already commented at 
the beginning of the second chapter introducing the principles of PCA risk 
management. Principal Components Analysis provides principal components of 
risk, or PCR. We then regress the daily differences of CDS onto the daily 
differences of PCR(s) and we interpret the R squared as the degree of the 
reactiveness of Debt to the variation in the value of assets. 
We then run a similar regression where we regress the daily variations of the 
stock’s price onto the daily differences of PCR(s) and we interpret the R squared 
as the degree of the reactiveness of Equity to the change in the value of assets. 
The sample period is the set of daily observations from 25th of October 2010 
until 19th of October 2012 (492 observations45). The banks whose CDS and 
equity Prices46 are explained in terms of PCR are47 
1. Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA (Monte) 
2. Credit Agricole SA (Calyon) 
3. Intesa Sanpaolo SpA (Intesa) 
4. BNP Paribas SA (BNP) 
5. Societe Generale SA (SocGen) 
6. Deutsche Bank AG (DB) 
7. Commerzbank AG (CMZB) 
8. Banco Santander SA (Santander) 
9. Credit Suisse Group AG (CS) 
10.Ubs AG (UBS) 
11.Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA (BBVA) 
                                                             
45 The period and the number of observations have to be consistent with the database where PCA 
risk management is applied and the PCRs derived. Hence we focus on a length of 2 years since we 
have already presented the results of PCA risk management on the same sample. 
46 Source for Equity prices is Bloomberg. Source for CDS level is Markit database. 
47 We discard the UK banks since we would need to consider liquid variables for the UK economy 
and determine UK specific PCR(s). All remaining banks compose the index Itraxx Financial Senior 
(series 12). 
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The liquid variables are48 
 Variable1: Swap EONIA 10Y (Yield in %) 
 Variable2: Swap EUR6M 10Y (Yield in %) 
 Variable3: 4.5Y Smooth GER (Yield in %) 
 Variable4: 4.5Y Smooth ESP (Yield in %) 
 Variable5: 4.5Y Smooth ITL (Yield in %) 
 Variable6: iTraxx Euro S12-Financial Senior (5 Year CDS in %) 
 Variable7: iTraxx Euro S12-Financial Sub (5 Year CDS in %) 
 Variable8: iTraxx Euro S12 Main (5 Year CDS in %) 
 Variable9: iTraxx Euro S12 Crossover (5 Year CDS in %) 
Hence first we will run a PCA on the latter variables and then regress the daily 
differences of CDS (and equity values) of each of the 11 banks listed above on 
the 3 PCR obtained.  
We will then obtain specific regression estimates for the CDS and the equity of 
each bank in the sample. Ceteris paribus, we would then expect higher 
coefficients for banks operating with lower capital and/or higher leverage. In the 
appendix we list the estimates of the regression. In this section we wish to 
explore the conclusions on the theme of capital structure, basing our 
considerations on the values of PCR Statistics49.  
  
                                                             
48 Source for the first five variables is Bloomberg; Markit database is the source for the remaining 
four variables. 
49 When we refer to R squared, we always refer to Adjusted R Squared.  
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TABLE 14: PCR STATISTICS COMPUTED FOR A SAMPLE OF EUROPEAN BANKS (SAMPLE FROM 25 
OCT 2010 TO 19 OCT 2012) 
 
PCR statistics, especially         and the estimates in the linear regression will 
allow to compare capital structures; they will also provide a base to the analysis 
of debt via decomposition into more liquid variables (PCR). This is relevant not 
only from a risk management perspective, but also from an investor point of 
view. 
The results summarized in the table above provide a picture where PCA risk 
management may be considered a good tool to explain risk and to explain the 
movements of both equity and debt. The role of debt in absorbing the volatility 
of assets is quite relevant, with         reaching levels50 even higher than 70%, 
for BNP Paribas.  
The inversion of capital structure, as defined in this work, is particularly evident 
for Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena and Credit Agricole. Although the 
explanatory power of PCR on Debt is quite high in these 2 cases, there is a 
substantial difference: Equity is also well explained by PCR in the case of Credit 
Agricole, with an adjusted R squared of 42.4%. Hence equity is still capable to 
absorb the risk as summarized by PCR; yet the debt of the same bank is 
explained with an R squared of over 70%, thus making systemic risk an 
important component of the risk to be managed by this financial institution. The 
                                                             
50 The heading of the column refers to R2(Debt) for         (and to R2(Equity) for        ). 
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same conclusion cannot be made for Banca Monte dei Paschi, where an adjusted 
R squared of 19.5% signals a poor explanatory power of PCR on the daily 
variations of the stock price. These results will be commented in depth in the 
section dedicated to PCR Capital Adequacy Test. 
Far from making statements from a regulatory point of view, the analysis of the 
PCR statistics for these 2 banks would argue that their equity is too weak to 
absorb the risk as measured via Principal components of risk. 
The lowest explanatory power of PCR onto Equity is reached by 2 banks: Banca 
Monte dei Paschi , as explaned above; and Commerzbank. It is relevant that in 
both cases the daily variations of CDS can still be explained in terms of PCR, 
whereas the same PCR have very poor descriptive power on equity. In both 
cases we are facing 2 banks where the sovereign state has intervened on 
different layers of the capital structure with aid packages during the most 
turbulent periods of the financial crisis. Hence one might interpret results of PCA 
risk management as reflecting that equity is no longer reactive to risk, leaving 
most of the adjustment to Debt. The sovereign aid may be interpreted as the 
need to reinforce a capital structure no longer capable to absorb the volatility of 
assets experienced during the financial crisis. 
The role of PCRs and CDS is quite powerful for management in its investment 
decisions. The most suitable investments are the ones which, ceteris paribus, 
exhibit a poor (or even negative) correlation with PCR. Risk weight factors (as 
they are defined today) may be misleading since they may provide incentives to 
invest into assets which require no or little regulatory capital, yet they may 
prove correlated with PCR. In case of inversion of capital structure, assets may 
exhibit a strong correlation with CDS. We will explore this theme in depth below. 
 
PCA Risk Management Metric for Systemic Risk 
We will make use of the econometric analysis above and analyze the estimates 
of the coefficients in the linear regression. Provided that         is high enough, 
then banks may be compared by investigating on the systemic risk handled by 
each one; this is equivalent to analyzing the magnitude of the linear coefficient 
estimated for PCR(1). We have two estimates: the coefficient obtained by 
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regression of Equity on PCR(s) and the analogous one derived by linear 
regression of CDS on PCR(s). We will consider only the latter. The reason for this 
choice lays in the definition of systemic risk provided in this work: we have 
associated it with a direct linkage that assets may have on the debt of the bank. 
This work has explored such linkage via the adoption of a linear regression 
model and therefore the measure of the explanatory value of the assets on Debt 
is investigated via the Adjusted R squared obtained regressing daily variation of 
CDS onto daily variations of the Principal Components of Risk. 
TABLE 15: EXPRESSING THE SYSTEMIC RISK VIA ESTIMATES OF REGRESSION OF CDS ON THE FIRST 
PRINCIPAL COMPONENT OF RISK. 
 
PCA risk management also allows a different perspective on the theme of 
leverage, which is very heavily scrutinized by regulators. The most popular 
measure of leverage is an accounting measure, the ratio between Total Assets 
and Equity. PCA risk management would argue instead that such a ratio may 
point towards a different direction from a risk analysis consistent with this work. 
Even when the leverage ratio is very high, there could be a poor correlation of 
the assets with PCR. Hence size should not matter if it is not converted into an 
adequate measure of risk. This is one more point where accounting and risk 
management may lead to different conclusions. 
If the adjusted R squared of the regression is high enough to justify the 
explanatory power of PCR, then a measure of leverage provided by the metric of 
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PCA risk management is given by the linear regression estimate listed in the 
table above. Such table lists the estimates, bank by bank, of the linear 
coefficient of the first PCR to explain the movement of CDS. With the exception 
of Deutsche Bank, the adjusted R squared51 are all higher than 40%, with an 
average of 60.65%. We then deduce that while Italian and Spanish banks exhibit 
the highest estimates of leverage (Risk corrected for PCR exposure), Swiss 
banks have the lowest leverage (according to a PCA risk management reading of 
risk). This is also easy to interpret in light of the safe heaven role played by 
Switzerland during the financial crisis. 
This approach to leverage and Systemic risk exposure could also produce 
incentives for management to reduce exposure not necessarily selling assets, in 
order to decrease the number of assets: Management could choose to reduce 
the exposure to PCR52, thus expecting that the magnitude of the linear 
coefficient of CDS onto PCR may decrease.   
Given the relevance in this work of the PCR statistics and the coefficients of PCR, 
we have conducted a series of tests to deal with the issue of unit root presence 
in the time series. Both the KPSS and the augmented Dickey–Fuller test point 
towards the conclusion that all principal components of risk and regressand 
variables are stationary. More detail is provided in the appendix. 
 
PCR Capital Adequacy Test and PCR Statistics: Inference on a Bank’s 
Capital Structure 
This chapter has presented a wealth of results relating to econometric 
regressions of Debt onto PCRs and Equity onto PCRs. The purpose of such 
regressions is to provide a viewpoint from an economic angle on the role of debt 
in explaining the evolution of capital structure when we restrict the analysis of 
risk to market variables only. We have therefore derived a measure of systemic 
risk, by analyzing the levels of adjusted R squares and the amount of the linear 
coefficient for the first Principal Component of risk. 
                                                             
51         , or R2(Debt) 
52 The variables composing PCR are traded, hence reduction of the exposure entails trading the 
liquid variables according to the weights α introduced in chapter 2 when defining PCR.  
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This section will instead assess the statistical significance of debt in the evolution 
of the capital structure, with respect to the variation of assets as described by 
PCRs. This test, introduced in the previous chapter, was named PCR Capital 
Adequacy Test and consists in testing 
H0: β=0 versus H1:      in the regression below:  
                     
Accepting the alternative hypothesis requires values of the t-statistics sufficiently 
high (absolute number). In essence the Capital Adequacy test imposes the 
analysis of a regression similar to the one run for the purpose of computing one 
of the PCR Statistic,        : the difference in the two regressions is in the 
introduction of one more regressor, the variation of CDS. Indeed           is the 
adjusted R squared obtained from the regression  
               
We will present the results of the PCR Capital Adequacy test for all the banks 
within the sample introduced above and determine the result of the test on the 
same dates adopted for the computation of the PCR Statistics. 
In the table below we will therefore summarize the evolution of R squared with 
and without the adoption of the daily variations of CDS as further regressor 
when explaining daily variations of Equity via daily variations of PCRs (in the 
table respectively R2(Equity)PCRCA  and R2(Equity)). 
The screening of the PCR statistics has already provided a qualitative 
understanding of the capital structure of the 11 banks analyzed above: does PCR 
Capital Adequacy test provide a similar assessment on their capital soundness? 
We will also list below the Estimate of β, and the lowest significance level at 
which the null hypothesis can be rejected (the P-value). 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, rejecting the significance of the debt in 
the regression when the fit of the data is poor (Adjusted R squared below a 
certain percentage) may simply imply that debt does not add much explanatory 
power to the evolution of equity when the latter is not well explained by PCRs 
either: hence the significance of CDS will be deemed poor. In such context to 
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accept the null hypothesis is not economically equivalent to the conclusion that 
the capital structure of the bank does not rely on debt for absorbing the volatility 
of assets. Therefore it may be inappropriate to conclude that the bank is well 
capitalized (in first place a poor R squared signals that Equity cannot be 
explained by the variation of assets, if the reader believes in the decomposition 
of market variables proposed by PCR).   
Hence methodologically the writer proposes to select a significance threshold 
and analyze which banks see the alternative hypothesis accepted. Formally the 
alternative hypothesis is a value of beta different from zero. By analyzing the 
regression, beta, if significantly different from zero, is expected to have a 
negative value, since a drop in the value of equity should manifest itself with 
higher risk of the debt, hence higher level of CDS. Hence, although we report P 
values for the alternative assumptions of a value of beta different from zero, 
economic intuition should lead to reject the relevance of debt for positive values 
of the t-statistic. This is the case for UBS and Intesa. In both cases the value of 
the t-statistic is positive and the R squared is very similar; the P-values would 
then encourage the conclusion that the alternative assumptions of Beta different 
from zero can be rejected in both cases, especially for Intesa (greater P-Value): 
hence the capital buffer of these 2 banks would seem appropriate according to 
this test. Would we derive a similar conclusion from the Debt Regression 
introduced in the previous chapter? 
TABLE 16: RESULTS OF THE EQUITY REGRESSION AND THE PCR CAPITAL ADEQUACY TEST 
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Economic intuition suggests that if Debt does not play a role in the evolution of 
the capital structure, then the variation of the assets will not have a good 
explanatory power on the variations of CDS. If instead we found a contradictory 
result, then the conclusion that the bank is well capitalized requires further 
scrutiny. The analysis of the Debt regression indeed brings a wealth of 
considerations that helps in understanding the different nature of these 2 banks, 
yet so similar at a very first stance derived from the PCR Capital Test. Not only 
the PCR statistic for debt is much higher for Intesa, but also the analysis of the 
coefficients shows that all coefficients for the 3 PCRs shows a significance lower 
than 1%. Hence we do not conclude that in the observed years Intesa has a 
sufficient buffer of equity such as to exclude the role of debt in explaining the 
variation of the assets. The actual sensitivity of debt, in terms of dependence 
from PCR(1) is over 6 times the one determined for UBS. We are keener instead 
in concluding that UBS is a well capitalized bank, due to its low coefficients for 
PCR(s) estimated in the Debt Regression and for the positive value of the t-
statistic while performing the PCR Capital Adequacy Test. 
TABLE 17: PCR CAPITAL ADEQUACY TEST AND PCR STATISTICS (INTESA AND UBS) 
 
We will now explore the banks whose Capital Adequacy Test leads to accept the 
alternative hypothesis with a significance at 1%. Calyon , Societe’ Generale, 
Santander and BBVA represent the bank where the null hypothesis is rejected, 
due to a value of Beta strictly negative. 
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TABLE 18: BANKS WHOSE CAPITAL ADEQUACY TEST REJECTS THE NULL HYPOTHESIS 
(WITH 99% CONFIDENCE) 
 
The joint analysis of PCR Capital Adequacy test and the of the results of the Debt 
regression on the Spanish banks (in the sample) will lead to the conclusion on 
the relevance of debt in the evolution of the capital structure (for a sample from 
25 Oct 2010 to 19 Oct 2012). Not only the PCR Capital Adequacy test rejects the 
null hypothesis of a null value for beta, but the Debt regression estimates the 3 
coefficients for the Principal components of risk at a significance of 1%. Credit 
Agricole’s capital structure also relies on debt in aborbing the risk of the assets. 
The coefficients of the Principal Components of Risks (for BBVA, Santander and 
Calyon) are estimated at a significance of 5%. Hence in this case PCR capital 
adequacy test and Debt regression, respectively with type I error probability of 
1% and 5% lead to the same conclusion of the relevance of the debt in 
explaining the variations of assets. A similar conclusion cannot be reached with 
the same low probability of type I error for Societe’ Generale. Indeed the second 
and the third component of risk may be irrelevant for the purpose of explaining 
the variations of debt (given the high P-value). 
We will now comment upon the banks where the null hypothesis was not 
rejected, which could hint that these banks do not rely on the role of debt for 
absorbing the variations of the assets. In order to gather a further insight on the 
results of the PCR Capital Adequacy Test we will avail ourselves of the Debt 
regression results and the Equity regression results. 
Credit Suisse and BNP not only pass the PCR Capital Adequacy Test, but the the 
second and the third principal component of risks may have no explanatory 
value on the variations of debt with probability higher than 5%. This is not the 
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result of a poor fit of the data, given the high adjusted R Squared of the debt 
regression of respectively 63.1% and 72.4%. Interpreting the results for 
Deutsche Bank is not so immediate. The linear coefficients for the 3 principal 
components of risk are estimated different from zero with a significance level 
lower than 1%. Yet it is important to notice that the the Debt Regression 
exhibits a poor fit of the data, with an adjusted R Squared of 38.4%, i.e. the 
lowest across the whole sample of banks investigated in this thesis. On the other 
hand economic intuition would suggest that the equity component is well 
explained, in its daily variations, by the PCR, with an adjusted R squared of 
57.3%, significantly higher than the adjusted R squared obtained in the Debt 
regression. We therefore conclude that PCR Capital Test and the Equity 
regression make the writer inclined to believe that the equity buffer for DB 
shows a magnitude such as to be deemed sufficient to absorb the daily variation 
of assets.   
TABLE 19: BANKS WHOSE CAPITAL ADEQUACY TESTACCEPTS THE NULL HYPOTHESIS 
 
Banca Monte Dei Paschi di Siena is one of the banks where PCR Capital 
Adequacy test and the Debt regression suggest two different judgements of the 
capital structure. Yet the PCR Capital Adequacy Test relies on a fit of data so 
much poorer than the Debt Regression (respectively adjusted R Squared of 
22.5% and 60.9%) that we deem valuable the analysis of the linear coefficient 
of the principal components of risk (in light of their significance). Not only they 
are different from zero with a significance level lower than 1%, but the 
magnitude of the coefficients is the highest across the entire sample.  
Data also shows that the Equity Regression provides a poor adjusted R squared 
(19.5%) due to increase slightly once we add CDS variations as one more 
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regressor (for the purpose of running the PCR Capital Adequacy Test). Such 
increase in the adjusted R Squared (from 19.5% to 22.5%) still signals a poor fit 
and therefore a statistical acceptance of the null hypothesis is of little added 
value, if compared to the quality of fit of the Debt Regression (60.9%). Hence 
the author is inclined to conclude that Debt plays a relevant role in adapting to 
the market variables variations for Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena. 
TABLE 20: RESULTS FOR BANCA MONTE DEI PASCHI DI SIENA 
 
 
Merging PCA Risk Management with a Regulatory Framework 
We have emphasized the limits and the rationale of the regulatory framework 
when it defines capital and risk weight factors. On one hand we acknowledge the 
need to build a framework not too market oriented. A limit of the PCA approach 
is that it derives from a market evaluation of risk. Hence such a risk 
management could overreact in case the market is stressing some market 
variables as a result of panic behavior or lack of liquidity53. On the other hand 
ignoring the market pricing may lead to divergences where Management 
addresses and discloses a measure of risk quite dissimilar from the ones 
perceived by the market.  
Hence this section is dedicated to the proposal of a new solvency ratio which, on 
one hand considers the accounting input and, on the other, embeds the most 
relevant conclusions here drawn in terms of risk management and Principal 
components of risk. 
                                                             
53 The author also believes that PCRs derived from a history of data of 2 years or more do not 
expose to the danger of running a risk management based on variables biased by panic or 
overreactions, under the belief that panic cannot last for such a long amount of time.  
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Changes in regulatory frameworks, mostly acknowledged at the time of writing 
as CRD IV have introduced a number of requirements on capital, some of which 
will be explored in the appendix. In terms of solvency ratio, as explained earlier 
in this work, such new definition of capital has affected primarily the numerator 
of the ratio (CT1/RWA). Risk management deals with risk on balance sheet as 
opposed to risk asset specific (not seen in the context of a balance sheet/ 
portfolio where it is hosted): hence this work should provide suggestions on the 
methodology to assign a weight converting an asset into a risk weighted asset 
(RWA), in light of the specific characteristics of the balance sheet and taking in 
consideration the behavior of the asset itself. 
The weight of the asset should ideally be higher for assets that represent a 
significant risk for the bank: if the reader believes that a reading of risk can be 
simplified via PCR(s), then the asset is risky if the correlation with PCR is high.  
On the other hand we can rely on PCR(s) for the purpose of summarizing 
balance sheet risk only if they have explanatory power on debt and/or equity of 
the bank.  
Furthermore, we would expect that a measure of soundness would suggest the 
strength of the balance sheet to tolerate an adverse shock: not a simple analysis 
of scenario, but an abrupt change in correlation that would deprive the bank 
from the diversification it was relying when composing the portfolio. If we revisit 
the evolution of the crisis, many assets behaved similarly during their fall in 
value. These vague principles will be clearer at the end of this paragraph when 
introducing a formula with all the inputs that we deem relevant to define the 
weight of one asset. 
For all these reasons the proposal of a Solvency Ratio relies on a numerator 
derived from an accounting measure of profits: it is very similar to the one 
considered in the Core Tier 1 Ratio. The implicit assumption that we are making 
is that the numerator, as a measure of available capital, has to reflect a long 
term measure which accounting models can provide. Ultimately if management 
has decided that some assets are not impaired in spite of their loss in value, 
they deem that they will recover the losses and therefore the accounting 
measure will prevail in the long term as a capital measure. On the other hand, to 
make the measure of Tier1 Capital credible, the latter cannot be composed of 
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latent losses for a percentage higher than k%, which is the reason why we 
introduce point (B) below.  
On the denominator we will give a different rule of construction, derived from 
the main concepts exposed in this work.  
The denominator will be a sum of the assets multiplied by a risk weight factor, 
similarly to the approach of risk weights as currently adopted. The only 
difference derives from the definition of risk weights which will depend, among 
others, upon the correlation between the yield of the assets and the PCR of the 
bank. Such a definition of solvency ratio would produce incentives to build a 
composition of assets aligned with a correct computation of risk reward in the 
metric of the balance sheet volatility. In this light a low yielding asset, yet poorly 
(or negatively) correlated with the evolution of the principal component of risk 
may be selected as a good investment by management. 
In line with the reasoning so far exposed, the definition of risk weights will be 
dependent on asset specific factors and bank specific factors. The considerations 
to be blended (numerically) for the purpose of enhancing the significance of 
capital ratios are: 
A. The explanatory power of the PCR on the stock of the bank and its debt 
(or CDS). If a bank is characterized by very contained Balance sheet 
variance (relative to its capital structure), then the incentive in adding 
among its assets a PCR correlated security should be treated differently 
from the same choice of another bank with high level of PCR Statistics. 
This point is very financial institution subjective and forces management 
to keep under control the balance sheet from cumulating too much 
systemic risk. This point is asset non specific, since it does not depend so 
much on the single asset but mainly on the capital structure of the bank 
determining the risk weights. For this reason the risk weight will be 
dependent on the value of the PCR statistics, i.e. the sum                . 
On the other hand, a low value of the PCR statistics warns that the 
reading given via PCR(s) has a weak explanatory power on the capital 
structure of the bank and therefore Risk weighted assets derived via a 
PCR Risk Management should be very small because such risk 
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management did not “guess” the principal component of risks apt to 
describe the evolution of the bank’s capital structure. 
B. The potential (accounting wise) that a large not realized loss is not 
deducted from Tier 1 Capital. In order to address such issue the bank 
should not exceed a certain percentage of Tier 1 Capital in terms of latent 
losses (hence not deducted from Tier 1 Capital). In simpler terms: 
unrealized losses not deducted from Tier 1 Capital cannot represent more 
than k% of the tier 1 capital. If they turn to be higher then the amount in 
excess has to be deducted from the numerator of the Tier 1 Ratio. This 
requirement allows market players to believe in the intrinsic amount of 
published capital by suggesting that a haircut (to the amount of Tier 1 
Capital and to the published ratios) higher than k% is too conservative. It 
also makes different banks comparable since two banks with and without 
latent losses over k% should reflect such difference. This requirement is 
also not asset specific. k should be a variable chosen by regulators. 
C. Estimate of the linear regression of the asset yield on the level of the first 
principal component of Risk: this factor is asset specific and encourages 
management in selecting investments efficient in terms of return versus 
systemic risk, rather than return versus generic risk. It is important to 
notice that a negatively correlated asset may generate therefore a 
negative risk weight, since the correlation would be negative. This would 
be an important incentive in not looking at the yield only of the asset but 
to apply a portfolio approach achieving the minimum balance sheet 
variance.  We will denote by               the correlation between the 
(variation of the) asset yield    and the (variation of the) first principal 
component of risk; we will denote by              the estimate in the linear 
regression  
                   
 
D. Historical average54 in the last 2 years of the implied probability of default 
derived from the CDS market. When a CDS market does not exist for the 
specific issuer, then a similar average should be computed in terms of the 
                                                             
54 Such historical average may be computed over a number of years equivalent to the residual 
maturity of the assets. For a matter of homogenous treatment of data the author prefers an 
average over the same history of data used to compute PCRs. 
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closest comparable by rating and sector. Such average allows smoothing 
out periods of panic in the market. Such implied average probability 
should be multiplied by (1-r), where r is the recovery value used as input 
to obtain the implied probability of default from the historical levels of 
CDS. We will denote the probability thus derived as p(r), which may be 
interpreted as a probability of default of the asset whose risk weight is to 
be determined55. 
Hence the risk weight for a specific asset i whose yield is    would be, according 
to the criteria listed above: 
[               ]   (         )| (         )|             
 
Accounting and Risk Management: Time to Use a Unique Language?  
Even if the reader agreed with most of the proposals and conclusions contained 
in this work, the implementation would face a technical difficulty: if management 
found a hedging technique which could reduce the balance sheet volatility, then 
what accounting format should be used? Any practitioner is aware that the 
adoption of derivatives as a hedging instrument is contemplated by IAS within a 
set of rules defining Hedge Accounting. Hedge Accounting has the ultimate 
rationale to preserve the value of the Hedged Item against a designated risk. 
Even without an in depth analysis a simple introduction to Hedge Accounting is 
enough to clarify that the notion of risk management introduced in this work is 
very different from the one known to accountants when applying Hedge 
Accounting: Risk management as per IAS approach deals with single assets 
and/or liabilities. This work instead proposes a frame to deal with balance sheet 
variance. Chances to ultimately address balance sheet variance via addressing 
the value of single assets are, in the writer’s opinion, very low. 
From a pure methodological approach a risk manager should identify principal 
risk factors, hedging policies and suggestions for management aiming at being 
                                                             
55 We acknowledge that the probability thus determined is not a “true” probability since it embeds 
a market price for the risk which, especially during turbulent times, may overestimate the “actual” 
probability of default. Yet this work is keener to incorporate within risk weights the actual price for 
risk, rather than a theoretical probability: management ultimately means implementing hedging 
policies at market prices rather than simply representing a distribution of risk with the doubt that 
it may prove wrong. 
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countercyclical with respect to the PCR. In a more pragmatic approach, 
especially when dealing with inverted capital structures, then a risk manager 
may find immediate to evaluate counter-cyclicality against CDS and not against 
PCR. Especially if debt is not liquid on the secondary market, then the author 
believes it may be efficiently approximated by the level of CDS (if quoted). 
Ultimately supporters of the notion of risk management discussed in this work 
will face a dilemma. Most of the risk summarized by the principal components of 
risk derives from assets under an accounting treatment which requires no 
change of value (accounting wise) unless a specific impairment is made. This is 
the most relevant contradiction: accounting shows no volatility whereas PCA 
driven Risk management emphasizes exactly the opposite. If a hedging policy 
were designed and proved efficient to implement according to PCA Risk 
management, then such policy would simply add noise to Financials, since it 
would hedge the value of assets whose accounting representation will instead 
show no variation. 
One of the reasons for the skepticism towards the soundness of the banking 
sector is due to a communication to the market of a value distorted from its 
economic perception: positive profits and drop in market capitalization are the 
sides of a coin where the market assessment of value is at odds with the 
accounting conclusions of management. Believing to the accounting 
measurement of value has proved very costly, since it caused, among other 
effects, that the banking sector was the slowest player in the market either in 
adjusting its risk, or in deciding not to adjust it at all, in the belief that ultimately 
capital is to be read through financials and not through market values. 
A proposal on how to fill the gap between these 2 measures of value is well 
beyond the purpose of this work and is left as a topic for future research. 
 
Subordinated debt: Can it Help in Reducing Balance Sheet Variance? 
In this section we provide the terms of a subordinated debt which may achieve 
the goal of reducing the balance sheet variance. We emphasize that such idea 
was never shared with a regulator: therefore some readers may find the 
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terminology “subordinated” misleading, since capital management typically 
associates a regulatory benefit in issuing a “subordinated” bond.  
We use the terminology “subordinated” since we see this as a new liability of the 
banking sector with a purpose different from standard senior issuance. Whereas 
senior issuance has the aim of securing liquidity for a certain maturity, the 
subordinated debt has the purpose to provide liabilities which rank lower than 
senior debt and whose purpose is a benefit on capital. In what we will describe 
below we do envision a benefit for the economic capital, since the balance sheet 
variance should decrease after the issuance of this typology of debt. Hence we 
may achieve a benefit by reducing balance sheet variance, but no conclusions 
can be drawn in terms of regulatory capital. 
In an ideal world, PCA Risk Management would see the purchase of long term 
options on the Principal Components of Risk as beneficial for the purpose of 
balance sheet variance reduction. Indeed, if the variance of the balance sheet is 
ultimately decomposed into Principal Components of Risk, then buying put 
options on such underlyings is ultimately variance reductive. 
Led by this intuition, we seek to translate this idea into a practical example; the 
market may not be liquid enough in pricing options on PCR, hence we analyze 
the variables composing PCR and select the few where an option market has 
developed. We will then embed such option within a newly conceived liability, 
which we will call “PCR redemption linked note”. Such note may redeem, upon 
the discretion of the issuer  
i. In cash for an amount equal to the notional amount or  
ii. In terms of other securities (or payout56) which are closely related to PCR. 
The reader may have already noticed the similarity with the construction of an 
ordinary convertible security. A description of the latter is beyond the scope of 
this work, but, in essence, the issuer of a convertible security may convert the 
amount borrowed into another instrument of the capital structure, typically 
equity (via a conversion factor). 
                                                             
56 The terminology established in the option market would then refer respectively to Physical or 
Cash delivery upon exercise. 
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The analogy is useful since the subordinated debt here presented gives the the 
issuer the optionality to choose, at a certain date, between a redemption at 
100% (or nominal value) or by delivering specified securities. 
In essence, such subordinated debt can be decomposed into the sum of a 
standard nominal liability (i.e. a liability whereby the issuer commits to 
redeeming at 100% of the notional amount) and a put option on one or more 
securities. 
The balance sheet variance will reduce simply because the bank is implicitly 
buying options to sell underlyings strongly related with PCR57. 
The success of this idea depends on the existence of market players whose 
balance sheet soundness does not depend from the same PCR that matter for 
the banking sector. Such players may be 
a) Capable to manage such volatility since the evolution of their balance 
sheet is not so correlated to the PCR or with the securities to be delivered 
in case of conversion.  
b) Long term buyers of the securities which can be delivered as a result of 
the conversion; such buyers may not be so sensitive to adverse 
movements of mark to market (such market players then achieve a 
significant yield enhancement as a result of the premium obtained from 
selling a put option on securities). 
A practical example of such liability can be designed for the banking sector: it 
would provide a benefit especially when the funding pressure for sovereigns and 
local banks reaches a high level of correlation. This event is not only widely 
explored by literature, but also consistent with the relevance of the government 
yields (to be deduced by analyzing the magnitude of the loadings) when defining 
the principal components of risk. 
                                                             
57 A variance reduction of the balance sheet requires a selection of the asset(s) with highest 
absolute loading in the definition of the first PCR. Then a PCR Redemption Linked note would imply 
to buy puts on assets with high positive loading (for the purpose of defining PCR(1)) and with a 
positive linear coefficient in the linear regression of the daily variation of CDS onto the first PCR (or 
with negative loading weight and a negative linear coefficient in the regression just mentioned). 
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At certain stages, volatility of financial CDS reached peaks signaling panic levels:  
during such turbulent times one of the most important variables in the definition 
of the PCR is the yield of the government securities.  
Hence, a PCR redemption linked note could be designed to lower the balance 
sheet volatility explained by government yields; a PCR redemption linked note 
would require that government securities be delivered at the discretion of the 
issuer. An example follows, aiming at providing details of a bond embedding a 
put option on government securities58: 
 10 years maturity 
 After 5 years (Exercise date ) the issuer (bank) has an option to 
1. Either redeem the note at 100% of the notional amount  
2. Or deliver government securities (specified at the time of the issuance of 
the PCR redemption linked note) with a maturity of 5 years and where 
Amount of securities to deliver: 
                                   
 Conversion factor = 100% / Forward price 
 Forward Price : the price for forward purchase on the securities; tenor is 
equal to the Exercise Date 
 Price of the PCR redemption note, which we will denote as “Offer Price”: 
                                             
 Put price: to be derived via standard literature models where the key 
input is the realized volatility or the deliverable securities; or implied 
volatility, if quoted in the market. 
 Coupon of the note prior to Exercise Date: 
                            
 CDS: The CDS level of the bank issuing the PCR Redemption linked note, 
fixed once, at issuance date. 
We will explore in the appendix the consistency of the PCR redemption linked 
note with the new Basel III framework, to assess similarities and differences 
                                                             
58 The issuance with a bond with such characteristics would benefit a financial institution whose 
PCR(1) is defined by high loading coefficient with respect to government yields. 
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with existing guidelines on the theme of instruments admissible for computation 
as regulatory capital. 
 
Conclusions  
Last 2 chapters present a model to address risk management and Capital 
Management founded on the tool of Principal Component Analysis: we thus 
define the Principal Components of Risk. The latter are not only a decomposition 
of risk by means of liquid variables, but also the regressors to evaluate the 
sensitivity of the capital structure of a bank to a modern and market implied 
definition of risk. A bank exhibits an Inverted Capital Structure when its debt is 
more reactive than equity to the evolution of Principal Components of Risk. We 
then revisit the concept of risk weight adopted in the definition of Core Tier 1 
Ratio and provide a measure of the latter more adherent to an economic concept 
of Capital (as opposed to a regulatory notion of capital). We propose economic 
and statistical methods to explore the soundness of banks’ capital structure. 
These methods, based on the evolution of equity and CDS, are applied to a 
sample of European Banks, for dates representing the peak of the current 
Financial Crisis (2010- 2012).  
While dealing with Balance Sheet Variance we revisit the role of subordinated 
debt and define a new liability conceived for the purpose of reducing balance 
sheet variance. We also adopt the PCA Risk management to explore the liquidity 
requirements imposed by Basel III (in the Appendix) 
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APPENDIX 
Subordinated debt and Basel III: the role of COCOS 
Basel III proposes a definition of the components of regulatory capital59 by 
introducing various layers of capital such as 
Common Equity Tier 1 
Additional Tier 1 Capital 
Tier 2 Capital 
We do not mean to provide a definition of the components of regulatory capital: 
we will focus on a particular requirement established for issued securities so that 
they may classify as liabilities and be eligible for the purpose of computation as 
Additional Tier 1 Capital. 
Instruments classified as liabilities for accounting purposes must have principal 
loss absorption through either  
(i) conversion to common shares at an objective pre-specified trigger point or 
(ii) a write-down mechanism which allocates losses to the instrument at a pre-
specified trigger point. The write-down will have the following effects: 
a. Reduce the claim of the instrument in liquidation; 
b. Reduce the amount re-paid when a call is exercised; and 
c. Partially or fully reduce coupon/dividend payments on the instrument.60 
Do PCA Risk Management and Basel III provide a definition of capital consistent 
with each other? In the section above we have identified the terms of a 
“subordinated” debt with the purpose of decreasing the balance sheet variance. 
The rational is simple enough: the conversion of a liability into variables closely 
related to Principal Components of Risk (the bank achieves a balance sheet 
variance reduction via a long position on options with underlying one or more 
components of the Principal Components of Risk). 
                                                             
59 Readers interested in the theme should refer to the wide literature and FAQ documents 
published by the bank for international settlement.  
60 Page 17, paragraph 55, number 11. 
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Hence Basel III and PCA Risk Management both rely on the optionality of 
Conversion. The differences arising from the 2 approaches are  
The trigger mechanism and the loss absorption: both terms intuitively recall an 
accounting language describing the clauses of conversion, with the definition of a 
trigger point. Some bonds eligible for computation within Additional Tier1 Capital 
convert into equity once the core Tier 1 Ratio falls below a certain minimum 
threshold. Some others, instead, simply deduct a certain amount from principal 
in case the event of fall of Core Tier 1 ratio materializes. The author has 
emphasized that accounting allows for “latent” losses (not yet realized). Hence a 
trigger point defined in terms of Core Tier 1 Ratio is not guaranteed to be 
activated when most required, i.e., when balance sheet volatility increases; the 
economic value of conversion would be maximized if it could be determined on a 
pure economic ground. A management experiencing exceptional turbulence may 
not attempt to reduce balance sheet volatility, by retaining as many losses as 
possible, hoping for a normalization phase. In such a scenario, losses would not 
be realized and the conversion mechanism would not trigger, thus providing little 
economic benefit. A conversion mechanism not defined in terms of accounting 
losses is therefore to be preferred, in the author’s opinion. 
The converted securities: this is the main point of difference between PCR Risk 
Management and Basel III. Basel III disposes that the converted securities 
should be common shares: certainly adding equity to the bank reduces leverage, 
and there could be no more efficient measure to address a moment of stress. 
Yet a Basel III compliant contingent convertible is not a viable solution for all 
banks, in light of the market appetite for these instruments, limited to the 
strongest financial institutions only. This is the reason why Contingent 
Convertibles, as defined by Basel III framework, have been issued only by the 
soundest financial institutions and such issuance cannot be contemplated by the 
weakest ones. More importantly the market will judge the potential volatility of 
profits and balance sheet to judge the probability of conversion. Hence banks 
operating into fragile economies are automatically deprived of this important 
instrument. The author then believes that a conversion into the Principal 
component of risks, or some of them, is the most affordable tool to decrease 
balance sheet volatility. An example is provided above.
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Basel 3 framework on liquidity: similarities and differences from PCA 
risk management 
"Basel III" is a comprehensive set of reform measures, developed by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, to strengthen the regulation, supervision 
and risk management of the banking sector. These measures aim to: 
Improve the banking sector's ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and 
economic stress, whatever the source 
Improve risk management and governance 
Strengthen banks' transparency and disclosures. 
The reforms target: 
bank-level, or microprudential, regulation, which will help raise the resilience of 
individual banking institutions to periods of stress. 
macroprudential, system wide risks that can build up across the banking sector 
as well as the procyclical amplification of these risks over time. 
These two approaches to supervision are complementary as greater resilience at 
the individual bank level reduces the risk of system wide shocks61.   
The purpose of this work is not to give a comprehensive analysis of the Basel III 
framework: yet we write this section to analyze if a PCA driven risk management 
is flexible enough to address some of the main innovations introduced by the 
regulatory changes introduced under the Basel III regulatory reforms. 
We will discuss in this section the introduction of liquidity requirements. 
Such new requirement is subject to a “transition period”, hence they are 
gradually being implemented, since their immediate adoption was not 
compatible with the balance sheet structure of the banking sector at the moment 
of release.  
Liquidity is addressed by the introduction of two ratios, the LCR (Liquidity Cover 
Ratio) and the NSFR (Net stable Funding Ratio). 
                                                             
61 From the web site of the Bank for International Settlement, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm 
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Basel III requires that liquidity be structurally addressed with a short term 
horizon (LCR) and a long term horizon (NSFR) coefficient. The first one is based 
on an assumption of net cash outflows in the next 30 calendar days; it thus 
requires an allocation of investments, at least for the amount of the net cash 
outflows, into “high quality liquid assets”. If we believed in a PCA approach to 
risk management, then we would require a poor correlation between the 
principal components of risk and such assets. The regulatory requirements do 
provide some qualitative requirements in line with the main intuitions of this 
work, since they include, among the “Fundamental characteristics” 
Low correlation with risky assets: the stock of high-quality liquid assets should 
not be subject to wrong-way (highly correlated) risk. For example, assets issued 
by financial institutions are more likely to be illiquid in times of liquidity stress in 
the banking sector62. 
Yet, when providing stringent criteria of the assets eligible for fulfilling this 
requirement, the document lists 
marketable securities representing claims on or claims guaranteed by 
sovereigns, central banks, non-central government PSEs, the Bank for 
International Settlements, the International Monetary Fund, the European 
Commission, or multilateral development banks and satisfying all of the following 
conditions: 
assigned a 0% risk-weight under the Basel II Standardised Approach; 
traded in large, deep and active repo or cash markets characterised by a low 
level of concentration; 
proven record as a reliable source of liquidity in the markets (repo or sale) even 
during stressed market conditions; and 
not an obligation of a financial institution or any of its affiliated entities.63 
It is not difficult to imagine securities which may satisfy all these requirements, 
yet show a strong level of correlation with the CDS of the bank addressing the 
liquidity risk. In such scenario it is very likely then that a period of funding stress 
                                                             
62 Page 5 of “Basel III: international framework for liquidity risk measurement 
63 Page 8 of the document 
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for the bank may also be a period of (economic) loss on the securities selected 
to satisfy the requirement of the LCR. An example is given by securities issued 
by a government experiencing a period of difficulty in its funding program: it 
would fulfill the requirements here listed, yet be a poor source of liquidity during 
a liquidity crunch. 
The rationale of the NSFR, instead, is summarized by requesting that available 
resources exist (“Available amount of stable funding”) to face the “Required 
amount of stable funding”. It is a longer term requirement (with respect to the 
LCR) which provides a weight to every liability in the balance sheet reflecting 
how stable such liability may be considered in providing funding. It also assigns 
a liquidity weight factor to every component of the asset to summarize in what 
extent such asset require stable funding. PCA risk management would argue in 
favour of a low liquidity factor to associate to assets if inversely correlated with 
the CDS of the bank (or with its principal components of risk). 
How would a PCA driven risk management address the liquidity risk? 
So far we have analyzed the regulatory framework imposing a solution 
ultimately made of an allocation, on the asset side, contemplating a short term 
stress in liquidity (LCR). Also the NSFR addresses the composition of liabilities so 
that there is consistency between assets and the stability of funding they 
require. What would a PCA driven risk management also suggest? Clearly this 
question is equivalent to also testing if the idea of risk management introduced 
in this work is robust enough to handle one of the most difficult problems of the 
financial crisis: liquidity. 
Liquidity risk is embedded in the level of CDS quoted by the market for a given 
Bank (i.e. the probability of default, as expressed by the CDS market, reflects 
not only the event of insolvency, but also an event of liquidity scarcity). Hence a 
PCA driven risk management would encourage a search for variables, 
explanatory of the liquidity of a bank, that are inversely correlated with the CDS.  
The author will use some of the conclusions drawn in a previous work where the 
problem of liquidity is addressed not with respect to a specific bank, but with 
respect to a set of financial institutions as per composition of the index Itraxx 
132 | A  j o u r n e y  t h r o u g h  t h e  c a p i t a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  b a n k i n g  s e c t o r  
 
Financial Senior. The conclusion of such work64 points at the role of the following 
variables and their explanatory power on financial CDS:  
a) The difference between Euribor and Eonia 
b) The difference between the yield of a German Government Bond and a 
government bond for the same maturity issued by a country experiencing 
a sovereign crisis 
c) The level of the cross currency EUR/USD, for a maturity below 5 years 
d) The difference between the level of the CDS and the yield of the 
government bond for a maturity of 5 years (such difference, named 
government basis, is particularly relevant in last 2 years, when liquidity 
has worsened to the point that monetary policy has adopted monetary 
quantitative measures). 
We will not offer a detailed description of the reasons why this empirical finding 
is justified, since the interested reader may explore the theme in depth by 
reading the aforementioned work. What is crucial to emphasize is that PCA Risk 
Management would assess the explanatory power of these variables on the CDS 
and the stock of the bank: based on the results then the bank can address how 
much of the volatility of CDS (and of the stock) can be justified mainly by the 
liquidity risk. If the stock and the debt of the bank are not reactive to these 
variables, then the market is pricing that the bank is robust enough against 
liquidity shocks. Hence liquidity requirements should be addressed with different 
degrees, depending on the specific situation of the bank: a unique standard is 
understandably imposed for the sake of clarity, yet the measures imposed are 
not the only way to address liquidity, which, alternatively, can be addressed also 
by hedging policies whose outcomes are countercyclical, on a statistical basis, 
with the evolution of CDS (and of the stock). Such hedging policies may involve, 
among others, the variables here mentioned at point (a), (b), (c), (d).  
We conclude this section by noting that the main idea of risk, being summarized 
by the principal components of risks appears robust enough as to provide a 
unifying framework for all risks even if a regulatory approach may address them 
separately.  When analyzing PCR at the beginning of this work, one of the 
                                                             
64 We invite the interested reader to explore the content of the work “CDS: Liquidity shortage or 
structural insolvency?” 
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variables negatively correlated with the evolution of the CDS is the difference in 
yield between “Core” government bonds and “peripheral” government bonds: 
this is consistent both with point (b) above and with the “Market related 
characteristics” of the securities which may be considered “high-quality liquid 
assets” in the context of the definition of LCR: 
Flight to quality: historically, the market has shown tendencies to move into 
these types of assets in a systemic crisis65. 
Hence PCA driven risk management and some requirements of LCR are 
proposing a common rationale in the choice of variables: in this respect PCA risk 
management and Basel III framework share some intuitions when addressing 
liquidity risk. 
                                                             
65 Page 5, 22b in the document Basel III: International framework for liquidity risk measurement, 
standards and monitoring. 
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Results of the regressions of Equity and CDS on Principal Components of 
Risk 
TABLE 21: REGRESSION OF EQUITY AND CDS ON PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS OF RISK 
 
TABLE 22: TESTS ON PCR- AUGMENTED DICKEY-FULLER TEST; KWIATKOWSKI, PHILLIPS, 
SCHMIDT, AND SHIN (KPSS) TEST 
 
Both tests provide statistical evidence for the conclusion that the principal 
components of risk, once considered as daily differences, are stationary 
variables. 
TABLE 23: DURBIN–WATSON STATISTICS APPLIED TO THE TIME SERIES OF THE DAILY 
DIFFERENCES OF EQUITY AND CDS LEVELS FOR THE BANKS IN THE SAMPLE 
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TABLE 24: TESTS APPLIED TO THE REGRESSAND VARIABLES. AUGMENTED DICKEY-
FULLER TEST; KWIATKOWSKI, PHILLIPS, SCHMIDT, AND SHIN (KPSS) TEST.  
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